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INTERBANK DISCIPLINE 
Kathryn Judge* 
ABSTRACT 
As banking has evolved over the last three decades, banks have become increasingly 
interconnected.  This Article draws attention to an effect of this development that has important 
policy ramifications yet remains largely unexamined—a dramatic rise in interbank discipline.  
The Article demonstrates that today’s large, complex banks have financial incentives to monitor 
risk taking at other banks, the infrastructure, competence, and information to be fairly effective 
monitors, and mechanisms through which they can respond when a bank changes its risk profile.  
This suggests that interbank discipline affects bank risk taking and merits more consideration 
than it has received thus far. 
The rise of interbank discipline has both positive and negative ramifications from a social 
welfare perspective.  The good news is that self-interested banks may be expected to penalize a 
bank when it takes excessive risks, thereby deterring such risk taking.  The bad news is that the 
interests of banks and society are not always so well aligned.  Other banks, for example, may be 
expected to reward a bank when it changes its risk profile in a way that increases the probability 
that the government would bail the bank out rather than allowing it to fail. This is because a 
bailout protects a bank’s creditors, even though it is socially costly. Interbank discipline may 
thus encourage banks to alter their activities in ways that increase systemic fragility.   
In drawing attention to the powerful yet mixed effects of interbank discipline on bank 
activity, this Article contributes to a new generation of scholarship on market discipline.  Its aim 
is not to question whether we need regulation, but to address the pressing issue of how we should 
allocate inherently finite regulatory resources.  By reducing the regulatory resources devoted to 
activities that other banks are performing relatively well, increasing the resources devoted to 
activities that regulators are uniquely situated or incentivized to address, and seeking to 
counteract the adverse effects of interbank discipline, bank oversight could be redesigned to 
more effectively promote the stability of the financial system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States and other nations are in the process of fundamentally rethinking how best 
to regulate banks.  The 2007 to 2008 financial crisis (the Crisis) triggered a global effort to 
reformulate financial regulation for the twenty-first century, and most changes adopted thus far 
respond directly to weaknesses revealed by the Crisis.  The success of efforts to design a 
financial regulatory regime capable of meeting the challenges ahead, however, depends on 
policymakers looking past the immediate causes of the Crisis to consider how the financial 
system has evolved in recent decades and the significance of those changes.  This Article sheds 
new light on one such development and the lessons it holds for policymakers interested in 
creating a more stable financial system. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2147899
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One of the most significant changes in the financial system over the last three decades has 
been a transformation in the nature of banks and banking.1  Traditionally, the majority of a 
bank’s interactions were with consumers and companies.  Banks accepted deposits and made 
loans, facilitating maturity transformation and credit intermediation.  Banks still engage in these 
activities, and they remain the primary activities of many community-based banks.  But a new 
breed of banks has come to dominate the financial landscape: the large, complex financial 
institution (referred to here as “complex banks”).2  In addition to taking deposits and extending 
loans, complex banks engage in a wide variety of other activities, including using credit default 
swaps and other derivatives to reallocate risk, making markets for securities, and engaging in 
other trading activity.3  These activities significantly increase interbank activity and exposure. At 
the same time, using financial innovations like securitization, which enables banks to sell loans 
they originate into a secondary market rather than holding all such loans to maturity, complex 
banks have reduced their direct credit exposure to the consumers and firms with whom they 
work.  As a result, the primary source of credit risk for today’s complex banks is other banks.4 
This transformation in banking has been well documented.5  Policymakers and others are 
attuned to this development, and to the potential for connections among banks to increase 
systemic fragility by increasing the probability that a weakness at one bank will lead to problems 
at others.6  They have also started to respond.7  Concerned about the safety and soundness of 
                                                                                                                                                       
 1. The term bank has been construed in a range of ways, with some using it to encompass “any 
financial intermediary . . . whether or not . . . regulated by banking regulators.”  RICHARD A. POSNER, 
THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY 9 (2010).  This Article takes an intermediate approach.  It uses 
the term only for firms that are regulated as banks or bank holding companies, but it includes financial 
institutions that would not have been considered banks, in the traditional sense, prior to the Crisis. 
 2. The analysis focuses upon the largest, most complex institutions that have come to dominate 
the banking landscape, see infra Part I.B, but much of the analysis extends to a broader swath of banking 
institutions. 
 3. See infra Part I.B. 
 4. See infra Part II.B. 
 5. See infra Part I.A. 
 6. E.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at the 
Brookings Institution Conference on Structuring the Financial Industry to Enhance Economic Growth and 
Stability, Industry Structure and Systemic Risk Regulation 2 (Dec. 4, 2012), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20121204a.htm (noting that “large financial 
institutions transact with one another on a nearly continuous basis and regularly maintain contractual 
relationships carrying substantial future obligations,” which means that “[t]he daily operations of most 
firms in the financial industry depend to a much greater extent on the conditions of their competitors than 
do such operations of firms in other industries.”). 
 7. E.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. & OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, INTERAGENCY 
SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE ON COUNTERPARTY CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT 2 (2011) [hereinafter 
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Bank A, for example, regulators have sought to ensure that Bank A has a risk management 
system that enables it to monitor its credit exposure to Bank B and adjust its exposure in light of 
changes in Bank B’s risk profile.  The aim of this oversight is to reduce the risk that Bank A will 
be harmed if Bank B gets into trouble.  What has gone relatively unexamined, however, is the 
effect of Bank A’s monitoring and disciplining of Bank B on Bank B.  That is the focus of this 
Article.  It builds upon the simple insight that if Bank A penalizes Bank B for some actions, but 
not others, the discipline Bank A imposes on Bank B alters Bank B’s incentives, and 
consequently, its activities. 
Shifting the focus in this manner provides two important insights into the significance of the 
rise in interbank activity.  First, the Article reveals that banks today are subject to much more 
robust market discipline than is commonly appreciated.  Policymakers and academics have long 
advocated using the market to discipline banks.8  Advocates of market discipline, however, have 
tended to approach the topic by focusing on an identifiable class of stakeholders, such as 
depositors or subordinated debtholders, and examining that constituency’s incentives to monitor 
and discipline a bank’s activities.9  Some commentators have recognized that banks may be 
uniquely well suited to discipline other banks, but they have tended to suggest that some 
regulatory change must be made for banks to have adequate incentives to monitor and discipline 
one another.10  This Article challenges that assumption.  It shows that banks often have myriad 
relationships with other banks.  When the credit exposures arising from these various 
relationships are aggregated, as banks increasingly (and soon must) do, it becomes apparent that 
                                                                                                                                                       
INTERAGENCY GUIDANCE] (“set[ting] forth sound practices and supervisory expectations,” with respect to 
managing “the risk that the counterparty to a transaction could default or deteriorate in creditworthiness,” 
including monitoring and aggregating individual counterparty exposures, regularly evaluating the 
creditworthiness of counterparties, and adjusting limits with respect to counterparties based upon those 
assessments); Lending Limits, 77 Fed. Reg. 37,265 (proposed June 21, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 
pts. 32, 159 &160) [hereinafter Lending Limits] (proposing to expand the definition of credit exposure 
and imposing more stringent limitations on a bank’s maximum credit exposure to another entity for banks 
under OCC’s jurisdiction); Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for 
Covered Companies, 79 Fed. Reg. 594, 600 (proposed Jan. 5, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 252) 
[hereinafter Enhanced Prudential Standards] (making similar proposals applicable to banks under the 
Federal Reserve’s jurisdiction and proposing other rules designed to improve banks’ risk management 
practices). 
 8. See infra Part I.B. 
 9. See infra Part I.B. 
 10. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis 
Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 555–56 (2011) (recognizing that derivatives counterparties (largely 
banks) are more likely to have the skills necessary to discipline other banks while assuming that banks 
lack adequate incentives to do so because of protections afforded to derivative counterparties under the 
Bankruptcy Code).  See also infra sources cited in notes 65−66 and accompanying text. 
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banks have massive economic exposure to one another.11  Far more often than not, financial 
companies top the list of industry exposures for complex banks like Citigroup, J.P. Morgan, and 
Goldman Sachs, surpassing categories like real estate, healthcare, and central banks.12  
Moreover, a recent study reveals that the largest complex banks often have credit exposure to 
other individual banks and counterparties at levels approaching 25 percent of the bank’s 
regulatory capital.13  Banks thus have strong economic incentives to monitor and discipline other 
banks, in addition to being relatively well suited to these tasks.  This does not mean that banks 
are perfect disciplinarians; they are not.  But it does suggest that interbank discipline is a 
sufficiently powerful market force to merit much more attention than it has received thus far.14 
Second, this Article highlights the mixed effects of market discipline.  Some effects are 
clearly positive.  If a bank starts taking excessive risks, other banks should notice and respond 
accordingly.  Banks do this for self-interested reasons—a bank does not want to assume excess 
credit risk unless it is compensated accordingly.  Nonetheless, this self-interested activity by 
banks promotes social welfare by discouraging other banks from taking excessive risks and 
penalizing them when they do.  The challenge is that the interests of banks and society are not 
always so well aligned.  In situations where they deviate, interbank discipline may incentivize 
banks to alter their activities in ways that increase their well-being while making the financial 
system as a whole less stable. 
Many of the gaps between the interests of banks and the interests of society become 
manifest in connection with periods of financial distress, as the interbank market tends to 
contract more than is socially optimal.  Such discrepancies have received significant attention 
from academics and policymakers, and serve as a primary rationale for having the Federal 
Reserve serve as a lender of last resort when banks are facing liquidity shortfalls.15  Yet, the 
shadow of possible government internvetion also gives rise to discrepancies even outside of 
these exceptional periods.   The perception that a bank is too-big-to-fail, for example, changes 
                                                                                                                                                       
 11. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 165(e)(3), 124 Stat. 1376, 1428 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365) (expanding the definition of 
credit exposure to include repurchase agreements (“repos”), reverse repos, other securities financing 
transactions and derivative transactions in addition to loans and traditional sources of credit risk); Lending 
Limits, supra note 7, at 37,272; Enhanced Prudential Standards, supra note 7, at 600. 
 12. See infra Part II.A. 
 13. Letter from The Clearing House et al., to Jennifer J. Johnson, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the 
Fed. Reserve Sys., at app. C (Apr. 27, 2012) [hereinafter Clearing House Letter to Fed]. 
 14. See infra Part II.D. 
 15. See infra Part III.B. 
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the willingness of a bank’s counterparties and other creditors to work with the bank, and terms 
they will offer.16  The greater the expected probability that the government will bail out an 
institution—to avert the social costs of allowing it to fail—the less reason a bank’s creditors have 
to be concerned about its financial health.  Morover, the Crisis revealed that the social costs of a 
bank’s demise may also dwarf the losses incurred by the bank and its stakeholders, creating a 
good chance of a government bailout, when a bank is “too interconnected” or “too correlated.” A 
bank is too correlated when it has a risk profile that is very similar to the risk profiles of other 
banks, making it likely that the correlated banks would face financial distress at the same time 
and policymakers would need to consider the social cost of their collective failure in deciding 
whether to intervene).17  This Article suggests that banks are more likely than other market 
participants to reward these types of changes in a bank’s risk profile, and thus more likely to 
incent such behavior.  
Interbank discipline is particularly likely to encourage banks to become more interconnected 
because a bank doubly benefits when it enters into a new relationship with another bank.  The 
bank itself becomes more interconnected, increasing the probability it will be bailed out.  
Further, the credit risk the bank assumes with respect to the other bank is reduced, at the 
margins, by the increased probability the other bank will be bailed out.  Similarly, in order to 
assess whether the types of risks a bank is exposed to are closely correlated to the risk exposures 
of other banks, a party must not only understand a bank’s risk profile, but also the risk profiles of 
other banks.  A typical subordinated debtholder lacks the incentives to do the additional due 
diligence necessary to obtain that information.  By contrast, the typical complex bank is already 
working with and monitoring most other banks.  Complex banks thus commonly possess the 
information necessary to make informed judgments about how correlated a bank’s risk profile is 
to other banks, making it more likely that they will respond—by rewarding—changes in this 
aspect of a bank’s risk profile.  In drawing attention to these and other dynamics, this Article 
shows how interbank discipline may function as a mechanism through which banks can take 
advantage of the government subsidy inherent in the possibility of a government bailout.  It also 
shows how interbank discipline may increase systemic risk. 
Drawing attention to the mixed effects of market discipline is one way this Article 
contributes to a new generation of literature on market discipline.  The notion of market 
                                                                                                                                                       
 16. See infra Part I.A. 
 17. See infra Part III.B. 
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discipline has gone out of vogue in the wake of the Crisis, and understandably so.  Early 
advocates of market discipline too often believed that market participants’ self interests could be 
relied upon to create a stable financial system and achieve other socially valuable ends.18  The 
Crisis revealed the fallacy of this assumption.  The self-interests of market participants are far 
from perfectly aligned with the interests of society; and, market participants can make mistakes, 
just like regulators.  Yet the answer is not to ignore market discipline.  To the extent that market 
discipline incents socially suboptimal bahvior, understanding market discipline can serve as a 
valuable guide for identifying areas that merit particular regulatory attention.  Moreover, as 
reflected in the significant number of missed deadlines and delays plaguing the implementation 
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act), 
regulators lack the expertise and resources to be relied upon as the sole tool for promoting good 
behavior.  Understanding the ways that the market disciplines banks can thus help us to 
understand how we can best deploy inherently finite regulatory resources. 
While the primary aim of this article is to draw attention to the power of interbank discipline 
and shed light on its effects, it also makes recommendations about how policymakers should 
respond to those effects. As an initial matter, the dynamics revealed here provide additional 
support for many of the reforms already underway.  For example, to the extent that the Dodd-
Frank Act's orderly liquidation provisions succeed in reducing the probability that the 
government will intervene to bail out a bank, the problematic effects of interbank discipline will 
be lessened.19  At the same time, such changes do not moot the need for further reform in light of 
interbank discipline.  Such responses seemed destined to be imperfect, even if helpful, in 
reducing the probability of a government bailout; and, there are benefits of interbank discipline 
that the current regime largely fails to harness. 20 
The Article’s policy recommendations are non-exhaustive and necessarily preliminary in 
nature.  Most arise from an analysis of the relative institutional competence of banks and 
regulators, and rely in part on the inherently finite nature of regulatory resources.  Recognizing 
that interbank discipline may be good at discouraging certain types of risk taking, not so good at 
addressing others, and downright problematic at times suggests that we should establish 
                                                                                                                                                       
 18. E.g., The Financial Crisis and the Role of the Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform Comm., 110th Cong. 16–18 (2008) (statement of Dr. Alan 
Greenspan, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board). 
 19. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. II, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1442–1520 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–94). 
 20. See infra Part I.B. 
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regulatory priorities that complement, support, and counteract, as appropriate, the effects of 
interbank discipline.  More specifically, the Article proposes reducing the regulatory resources 
devoted to activities that are duplicative of those already performed by banks, increasing the 
resources devoted to activities that regulators are uniquely motivated or positioned to address, 
and seeking ways to counteract the problematic effects of interbank discipline. 
The Article further suggests that the effects of interbank discipline, coupled with the 
transformation of banking from which it arises, may merit a more fundamental rethinking of the 
role of bank examinations.  More specifically, it may be time to reconsider whether bank 
examiners should continue to be required to reach firm conclusions regarding the safety and 
soundness of complex banks.  While the bank examiners’ assessments are not made public, 
banks and other market participants know, and potentially rely upon, examiners’ obligation to 
reach broad conclusions about a bank’s well-being.  Revising the nature of the conclusions that 
bank examiners are asked to reach may improve market discipline by making the limits of 
oversight clear.  It could also facilitate a shift toward a regime that more effectively harnesses the 
power of banks and regulators in ways that reflect their relative incentives and competence. 
The Article proceeds in five parts.  Part I provides background.  It considers the primary 
rationales for regulating banks and the social costs of bank failures.  It also provides an overview 
of the ways that banking has changed over the last three decades, focusing on the rise of complex 
banks.  It is these new complex banks, and the connections among them, that are the focus of this 
Article.  Part I concludes by situating this Article’s analysis of interbank discipline in the 
literature on market discipline. 
Part II examines interbank discipline.  It uses publicly available information about banks’ 
risk exposures to show that other banks are a leading source of credit exposure for most complex 
banks.  This Part further draws upon information about banks’ risk management practices, and 
changes in those practices, to demonstrate why interbank exposures are likely to translate into 
active monitoring of banks by other banks.  And, this Part describes the mechanisms through 
which banks can, and do, discipline one another.  It further considers evidence that banks’ efforts 
to manage other risks that arise from interbank activity—such as operation risks—separately 
contribute to interbank discipline.  It concludes by considering the significance of the Crisis, and 
the reasons that the Crisis does not undermine this Article’s claims regarding the importance of 
interbank discipline. 
Part III addresses the institutional competence and incentives of banks as disciplinarians.  It 
explains why banks may be more effective at monitoring and disciplining each other than most 
60:5 Judge DRAFT  
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other market participants and it considers empirical evidence supportive of their efficacy.  Part 
III also draws attention to the ways that banks’ interests systematically deviate from those that 
are socially optimal.  In so doing, it shows how interbank discipline may cause banks to modify 
their behavior in ways that benefit the banks involved while simultaneously contributing to the 
fragility of the financial system.  Part III thus sheds light on the probable effects of interbank 
discipline, and provides a basis for considering how policymakers should respond. 
Part IV describes the bank oversight process and the leading bank regulators, the final pieces 
of information necessary to make meaningful recommendations about the policy ramifications of 
interbank discipline.  It highlights the advantages that bank examiners enjoy relative to market 
participants, including inside access and an array of tools for changing a bank’s activities.  It also 
sheds light on pragmatic considerations that shape how regulators use the advantages afforded to 
them. 
Part V proposes some steps for crafting a path forward.  It examines the policy implications 
of interbank discipline in light of the relative institutional incentives and competencies of banks 
and regulators.  It proposes modest steps that could be taken to reduce the adverse consequences 
of interbank discipline while harnessing the socially productive dimension of this phenomenon.  
The proposals include specific suggestions, such as using the information that the interbank 
market helps produce as a component in determining the premium a bank must pay for its 
government-provided deposit insurance.  It also shows how the analysis here supports a more 
fundamental rethinking of the aims of bank examination. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This Part provides a brief introduction to the rationales for bank regulation.  It then 
describes the changing nature of banking and the role given to market discipline in the current 
regime.21 
A. Banking and Banking Regulation 
Of the numerous explanations that have been provided for regulating banks, two tend to 
dominate.22  The first relates to deposit insurance.  Because banks invest their capital in long-
                                                                                                                                                       
 21. Many of the issues this Article addresses, including the transformation in banking and the rise 
of interbank discipline, are international phenomena.  Nonetheless, because context and history are at 
times significant, the Article focuses on the United States when appropriate and it uses U.S. banks and 
regulators as the relevant reference points. 
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term assets, like loans, while receiving much of that capital from short-term liabilities, like 
demand deposits, banks are inherently unstable.23  No bank has sufficient liquid assets to repay 
all of its depositors should they demand their money back at the same time.  Deposit insurance 
promotes bank stability, a social good, by eliminating a depositor’s incentive to be first in line to 
get his money back at the first sign that a bank may be in trouble.24  The challenge is that deposit 
insurance also gives rise to moral hazard.  If depositors can rely upon the government to insure 
their deposits, they have little reason to monitor or restrain bank risk taking.25  As a result, a bank 
that engages in very risky behavior can obtain capital from deposits on substantially the same 
favorable terms as a bank pursuing a more conservative course of conduct.  As greater risks 
generally lead to greater returns, banks with insured deposits have an incentive to take excessive 
risks.26 
The second and related rationale for regulating banks arises from the social costs of bank 
failures, particularly when part of a financial crisis.  As reflected in a recent study, systemic 
banking crises are associated with “deep and prolonged” declines in asset values, “profound 
declines in output and employment,” and an increase in government debt that averages 86 
percent in the three years following the crisis.27  Because these costs far exceed the losses 
incurred by the banks and their stakeholders, banks are not incentivized to restrain their risk 
                                                                                                                                                       
 22. See Mark J. Flannery, Supervising Bank Safety and Soundness: Some Open Issues, Banking, 
92 FED. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV. 83, 85−86 (2007) (summarizing the rationales that have been given 
for bank regulation and identifying the moral hazard created by deposit insurance and the social costs of 
bank failures as the two most important). 
 23. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 
J. POL. ECON. 401, 402−03 (1983) (demonstrating why even a solvent bank may be subject to a 
debilitating bank run). 
 24. See id. at 418. 
 25. Jens Forssbæck, Ownership Structure, Market Discipline, and Banks’ Risk-Taking Incentives 
Under Deposit Insurance, 35 J. BANKING & FIN. 2666, 2666 (2011) (“What deposit insurance does is to 
remove depositors’ incentives to discipline the bank by charging a risk premium commensurate with the 
bank’s risk level, their own costs of monitoring, and other agency-related costs . . . .”); Jonathan R. 
Macey & Elizabeth H. Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors: A Summary of the Theoretical and 
Empirical Arguments, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 215, 220 (1988) (“[D]epositors will be indifferent between 
putting their money in insured, riskless banks at riskless rates of return and putting their money in 
uninsured, risky banks at higher, risk-adjusted rates of return . . . .”). 
 26. Forssbæck, supra note 25, at 2677 (“[T]he existence of deposit insurance . . . introduces a 
subsidy on increased risk.”); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, Solving the Corporate Governance 
Problems of Banks: A Proposal, 120 BANKING L.J. 326, 328 (2003) (explaining that “the implementation 
of deposit insurance poses a regulatory cost of its own—it gives the shareholders and the managers of 
insured banks incentives to engage in excessive risk taking”). 
 27. CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES 
OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 224 (2009). 
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taking to a socially optimal level.  Exacerbating this incentive problem, and transforming it into a 
source of moral hazard, is the fact that governments often intervene to prevent a bank from 
failing when the externalities from allowing it to fail are sufficiently large.28 
There have been meaningful attempts to reduce both of these sources of moral hazard.  The 
primary mechanism for trying to reduce the moral hazard arising from deposit insurance is the 
use of risk-based premiums.29  If the premium a bank pays for deposit insurance accurately 
reflects the probability that the bank will fail and the cost to the insurance fund of its failure, the 
moral hazard largely disappears.30  Banks that take greater risks will internalize the costs of those 
decisions through higher premiums.31  Experience has shown, however, that risk-based 
premiums are not a panacea and cannot be relied upon to alleviate the moral hazard deposit 
insurance creates.32  The premiums banks pay for deposit insurance continue to be risk based, but 
the appropriate formulas to use remain a matter of ongoing debate.33 
There have also been attempts to reign in the moral hazard arising from government 
bailouts.  A central aim of the Dodd-Frank Act is to reduce the probability of future bank 
bailouts and a number of its provisions effectively further this aim.34  The Dodd-Frank Act, for 
example, attempts to make it easier for regulators to close systemically significant banks, thereby 
                                                                                                                                                       
 28. DARRELL DUFFIE, HOW BIG BANKS FAIL AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 5 (2011) (explaining 
that “the common knowledge that too-big-to-fail financial institutions will receive support when they are 
sufficiently distressed—in order to limit disruptions to the economy—provides an . . . incentive to large 
financial institutions to take inefficient risks, a well-understood [source of] moral hazard”). 
 29. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b) (2006). 
 30. GEORGE J. BENSTON ET AL., PERSPECTIVES ON SAFE AND SOUND BANKING: PAST, PRESENT, 
AND FUTURE 230 (1986). 
 31. Id. at 231. 
 32. Compare BENSTON ET AL., supra note 30, at 227−43 (advocating risk-based insurance 
premiums), with Robert A. Eisenbeis, Hindsight and Foresight about Safe and Sound Banking, in 
Roundtable Discussion: Reflection on Twenty Years of Bank Regulatory Reform, 92 FED. BANK OF 
ATLANTA ECON. REV. 124, 124, (2007) (explaining the challenges posed in translating risk-based deposit 
insurance into practice and his view that he and others who propose it have placed excessive emphasis on 
its importance) and George Kaufman, Some Further Thoughts About the Road to Safer Banking, in 
Roundtable Discussion: Reflection on Twenty Years of Bank Regulatory Reform, 92 FED. BANK OF 
ATLANTA ECON. REV. 135, 135 (2007) (explaining that with the benefit of hindsight and experience, he is 
no longer “enamored with risk-related ex ante FDIC deposit insurance premiums”). 
 33. See, e.g., Assessments, Large Bank Pricing, 76 Fed. Reg. 10,672, 10,676 (Feb. 25, 2011) (to 
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 327) (describing proposed changes to the process for calculating the 
“premiums” to be paid by large banks and open issues regarding implementation). 
 34. Lissa Lamkin Broome, The Dodd-Frank Act: TARP Bailout Backlash and Too Big to Fail, 15 
N.C. BANKING INST. 69, 70, 76–80 (2011) (“describ[ing] how Dodd-Frank . . . attempts to change the 
phrase ‘too big to fail’ to ‘too big, will fail’” and providing a summary of the key provisions in Dodd-
Frank designed to reduce the likelihood of future government bailouts). 
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reducing the temptation to prop up a failing firm.35  At the international level, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, the leading multinational forum on bank regulation, is 
similarly revising its capital adequacy and other requirements in order to reduce and combat this 
source of moral hazard.36  The reforms include efforts to cause a bank to internalize, on an 
ongoing basis, additional costs when it becomes too-big-to-fail or otherwise changes its risk 
profile in a way that increases the probability its government would feel obliged to prevent it 
from failing. 
The government has a long history, however, of attempting to reduce this moral hazard. 
While such efforts have at times succeeded in reducing market expectations regarding the 
probability of a bailout, the problem has never been eliminated.37  Moreover, many view the 
Crisis as affirming the principle that the government will inevitably intervene to save an 
institution when the costs of its failure are sufficiently great.38  Academics, like Adam Levitin, 
have provided theoretical support for the notion that it is impossible to eliminate this source of 
moral hazard completely.39  In Levitin’s analysis, “[b]ailouts are an inevitable feature of modern 
economies,” because any “standardized resolution system” that may be adopted ex ante will, at 
times, result in “socially unacceptable” outcomes if adhered to when a crisis actually hits.40  In 
the face of such an outcome, policymakers will almost assuredly find a way around the 
                                                                                                                                                       
 35. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. II, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1442–1520 (2010 & Supp. 2012) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–94). 
 36. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 7 (2011) [hereinafter BASEL III] 
(describing how the Basel III framework seeks to implement an “integrated approach” to addressing the 
challenges posed by “systemically important financial institutions” which could include “capital 
surcharges, contingent capital and bail-in debt”). 
 37. See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks of 
Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957, 994−1001 (1992) (describing the mixed success of efforts to 
limit the moral hazard that arose following the 1984 rescue of Continental Illinois on the basis of its being 
too big to fail). 
 38. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 141 (2012) [hereinafter FSOC, 
2012 ANNUAL REPORT] (noting that “many observers interpret actions taken by government authorities 
during the recent crisis as evidence that the public sector provides an implicit guarantee to large complex 
financial institutions”). 
 39. Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 439 (2011); see also Jonathan R. 
Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust Approach to Financial 
Regulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368, 1370 (2011) (recognizing that “[p]olicymakers . . . cannot credibly 
commit to refrain from supporting large, important financial institutions” and explaining the intractable 
nature of the challenge); Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Curbing Risk on Wall Street, NAT’L AFFAIRS, 
Spring 2010, at 21 (acknowledging that bailouts are very often the “most practicable response to very real 
threats to the financial system”). 
 40. Levitin, supra note 39, at 439. 
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precommitment device they had previously fashioned.41  Hence, the possibility of a bailout 
cannot be reduced to zero so long as bank failures impose costs on parties other than the bank 
and its stakeholders. 
In light of the externalities that may arise from bank failures, and the moral hazard created 
by deposit insurance and the inevitable possibility of a government bailout, governments have 
long imposed an array of regulations on banks.  As reflected in the three “pillars” put forth by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the tools most commonly used to limit bank risk 
taking are: (1) the imposition of capital adequacy requirements, (2) supervisory oversight, and 
(3) market discipline.42  Many countries supplement these measures in a variety of ways, as 
reflected in the Volcker Rule in the United States, which limits the types of activities in which 
banks can engage, and new rules in the United Kingdom requiring banks to insulate their core 
lending divisions from other, riskier activities in which the bank may be engaged.43 
B. Changing Nature of Banking 
While the centrality of banks to a functioning economy has remained constant, the nature of 
banking has not.  Over the last few decades, the number of commercial banks has fallen by half, 
the size of the average commercial bank has more than tripled, securitization has created a 
secondary market for loans, enabling banks to sell loans they originate rather than holding them 
to maturity, and bank activities now extend far beyond relationship lending.44  Central to the 
“fundamental changes” that have occurred over this period has been a bifurcation of the banking 
                                                                                                                                                       
 41. Id.  As Levitin’s analysis makes clear, the decision to bail out a failing institution is driven by 
the political economy as much, if not more, than actual economic considerations.  Thus, while this Article 
focuses on situations where a bailout is justified by reference to the systemic costs of allowing an 
institution to fail, there may well be a greater swathe of circumstances where a bailout is sufficiently 
predictable to affect creditors’ assessments of the riskiness of working with a particular institution. 
 42. BASEL III, supra note 36; BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL 
CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK 
(2005). 
 43. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1620–31 (2010 & Supp. 2012) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851) (imposing an array of new 
limitations on the ability of commercial banks to engage in proprietary trading and make certain types of 
investments); Paul Hannon, U.K. Sticks With Banking Reforms, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2012, 7:17 pm), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304451104577388041493093010.html (stating that 
“[t]he U.K. government . . . is on track to pass legislation that will protect the retail operations of banks 
from the banks’ more risky investment-bank activities”). 
 44. Loretta J. Mester, Commentary, Some Thoughts on the Evolution of the Banking System and 
the Process of Financial Intermediation, 92 FED. RESERVE BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV. 67, 67 (2007); 
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000: 
Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215. 
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industry into two fundamentally different types of institutions.45  On one hand are the 
community-based banks that provide traditional bank services like taking deposits and 
relationship-based lending.46  As recently as 1980, community banks with assets of less than $1 
billion (in 2001 dollars) constituted 97 percent of commercial banks and held the majority of 
bank assets.47  On the other hand are the new complex banks.  These banks engage in a wide 
variety of financial activities beyond taking deposits and making loans, rely more heavily on fee-
based income, and use more standardized methodologies for evaluating the creditworthiness of 
people and firms.48  Complex banks are also central players in many facets of the “shadow 
banking system,” which has also come to play a central role in facilitating the flow of capital in 
today’s financial system.49  This new breed of bank has come to dominate the industry.  Even 
before the Crisis, banks with more than $10 billion in assets (in 2005 dollars) held 75 percent of 
banking assets.50  And, as a result of further consolidation precipitated by the Crisis, the ten 
largest banks in the United States now hold 77 percent of the industry’s domestic assets, and the 
five largest hold a full 52 percent.51 
                                                                                                                                                       
 45. Robert DeYoung, Safety, Soundness, and the Evolution of the U.S. Banking Industry, 92 FED. 
RESERVE BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV. 41, 51–2 (2007); see also Wilmarth, supra note 44, at 254–57. 
 46. DeYoung, supra note 45, at 41−43; see also Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A 
Perspective on Bank Deregulation in a Deregulatory Age, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 501, 516 (1989) 
(explaining that the core of traditional banking lied in the “power to take deposits, [which] . . . not only 
provided banks with a cheap source of funding, but also enabled banks to build relationships with 
potential customers for other bank products, such as lines of credit, mortgages or credit cards . . . [thereby 
allowing banks to provide a] unique cluster of products and services”). 
 47. DeYoung, supra note 45, at 43. 
 48. Id. at 53−56; FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 59 (2011) 
[hereinafter FSOC, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT] (comparing Chart 5.2.12 and 5.2.13 demonstrates that 
community banks continue to derive a significantly greater proportion of their income from net interest 
income while large, complex banks earn relatively more in fees and other ways); Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Harry Huizinga, Bank Activity and Funding Strategies: The Impact on Risk and Returns, 98 J. FIN. ECON. 
626, 630 (2010) (showing that the proportion of income from fees is increasing as a proportion of bank 
income, while net interest income—the traditional source of income for community banks—is declining 
on a relative basis). 
 49. See Erik F. Gerding, The Shadow Banking System and Its Legal Origins 6–36 (Aug. 23, 
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1990816 (providing a 
comprehensive definition of the shadow banking system and its structure); Tobias Adrian & Adam B. 
Ashcraft, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Shadow Banking Regulation, STAFF REPORT No. 559 (2012), 
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr559.pdf (reviewing the literature on 
shadow banking). 
 50. Mester, supra note 44, at 67; see also FSOC, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 48, at 69, 
Chart 5.2.38 (graphically depicting the rapid decline in industry assets held by small and medium-sized 
banks and the correspondent increase in the assets held by the largest banks). 
 51. Editorial, Banking Run Amok Is Less Likely a Year After Dodd-Frank: View, BLOOMBERG 
NEWS (July 17, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-17/banking-run-amok-is-less-likely-a-
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One effect of the changing nature of banking is to change banks’ interactions with one 
another.  Banks have long made short-term loans to other banks and the interbank market has 
thus played an important role in redistributing liquidity from banks that have it to those in need 
of it.  Nonetheless, banks’ main sources of credit risk traditionally were the companies and 
persons to whom they loaned money and the assets, such as real estate, that served as collateral 
on those loans.  Today’s typical complex bank, by contrast, holds proportionately fewer loans on 
its balance sheet, reducing significantly its exposure to such sources of credit risk.  At the same 
time, they engage in an array of new activities, many of which entail working with, and thereby 
increasing exposure to, other banks.52 
A typical complex bank will often have myriad relationships with other banks, including as 
a counterparty on swaps and other ongoing transactions, as a lender, as a depositor of cash in the 
other institution, and through other arrangements, such as resale and repurchase agreements 
(repos) and pending settlements.  Each of these relationships gives the complex bank a self-
interested reason to be concerned about other banks’ financial well-being.  As explained by one 
of the leading complex banks, J.P. Morgan: 
Financial services institutions are interrelated as a result of market-making, 
trading, clearing, counterparty, [and] other relationships.  The Firm [, J.P. 
Morgan,] routinely executes transactions with counterparties in the financial 
services industry, including brokers and dealers, commercial banks, investment 
banks, mutual and hedge funds, and other institutional clients.  Many of these 
transactions expose the Firm to credit risk in the event of a default by the 
counterparty or client.  The Firm [also] provid[es] clearing, custodial and prime 
brokerage services for financial services companies . . . , all of which can increase 
the Firm’s operational and litigation costs [should the other firm fail].53 
                                                                                                                                                       
year-after-dodd-frank-view.html; Tom Frost, The Big Danger With Big Bank, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2012, 
at A15. 
 52. DUFFIE, supra note 28, at 4 (treating complex banks as a “distinct class,” and recognizing that 
they differ from traditional banks in a number of regards, including that “[t]hey typically act as 
intermediaries in the markets for securities, repurchase agreements, securities lending, and [OTC] 
derivatives”, “[t]hey are prime brokers to hedge funds and provide asset management services” and 
“[t]hey may also act as investment banks”); SHELAGH HEFFERNAN, MODERN BANKING 41−99 (2005) 
(providing a thorough description of the new activities banks have undertaken in recent decades). 
 53. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 2011 Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 10 (Feb. 29, 2012) 
[hereinafter J.P. Morgan Annual Report 2011]. 
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Additionally, the one source of exposure that banks have always had to one another, that arising 
from short-term loans, has also increased in recent decades.54  As a result, other banks often 
comprise a primary source of credit risk for today’s complex banks, and complex banks invest 
significant resources monitoring and disciplining other banks.55 
Despite this rise in interbank activity and discipline, the phenomenon has received little 
attention in the literature on market discipline. The next Subpart considers why. 
C. Background on Market Discipline 
The notion that markets have the potential to discipline banks and that regulators should 
promote such discipline is well established.  As recognized by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, “market discipline has the potential to reinforce capital regulation and other 
supervisory efforts to promote safety and soundness in banks and financial systems.”56  Many of 
the benefits of market discipline are those that arise from markets generally.  Rather than relying 
upon a single person or regulator’s assessment of a bank’s risk exposures, market discipline 
entails multiple actors, each making independent assessments and taking actions on the basis of 
their findings.  This is particularly valuable in light of the inherently limited capacity of 
regulators to identify and respond to all of the risks to which a bank may be exposed.57 
Most academics and policymakers interested in market discipline approach the issue by 
looking at a typical bank’s balance sheet and assessing whether and to what degree each 
identifiable category of stakeholder—depositors, other debt holders, equity holders, and the 
like—has an incentive to monitor and restrain the bank’s risk taking.58  It is often noted, for 
                                                                                                                                                       
 54. HEFFERNAN, supra note 52, at 66 (describing the “very rapid” growth of interbank activity, 
with interbank claims rising from $1.5 trillion in 1983 to $11.1 trillion in 2000, approximately half of 
which took the form of loans). 
 55. See infra Part II.A. 
 56. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: PILLAR 3 (MARKET 
DISCIPLINE), SUPPORTING DOCUMENT TO THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD 1 (2001). 
 57. E.g., Roe, supra note 10, at 589 (explaining the importance of market discipline as lying in 
the fact that “prudential regulation will [inevitably] be imperfect, because of the standard debilities of 
government actors and because of the potential for capture by the regulated”). 
 58. E.g., PETER J. WALLISON, BACK FROM THE BRINK: A PRACTICAL PLAN FOR PRIVATIZING 
DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND STRENGTHENING OUR BANKS AND THRIFTS 2–3 (1990); Elena Cubillas, Ana 
Rosa Fonseca & Francisco González, Banking Crises and Market Discipline: International Evidence, 36 
J. BANKING & FIN. 2285 (2012); Douglas D. Evanoff, Preferred Sources of Market Discipline, 10 YALE 
J. ON REG. 347, 350 (1993); Douglas D. Evanoff, Julapa A. Jagtianib & Taisuke Nakatac, Enhancing 
Market Discipline in Banking: The Role of Subordinated Debt in Financial Regulatory Reform, 63 J. OF 
ECON. & BUSINESS 1 (2011); Forssbæck, supra note 25; Eric J. Gouvin, Shareholder Enforced Market 
Discipline: How Much Is Too Much?, 16 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 311 (1997); William Poole, Moral 
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example, that as a result of deposit insurance, most depositors have little incentive to monitor 
bank risk taking.59  Because such analyses generally focus on ways to improve market discipline, 
they often result in calls for banks to issue subordinated debt (or, more recently, debt that 
converts into equity), reasoning that the subordinated debt holders will have the right incentive to 
monitor and discipline bank risk taking.60  There have also been a number of proposals to 
improve market discipline by modifying the deposit insurance scheme to give depositors greater 
incentives to monitor and respond to bank risk taking.61  The other important strand in the 
literature on market discipline focuses on disclosure.  Recognizing that market participants will 
impose meaningful discipline only to the extent that they can accurately assess the risks to which 
a bank is exposed, regulators require banks to disclose information intended to facilitate market 
discipline.  Academics have made a number of innovative proposals for ways to modify 
disclosure requirements to improve the quality of the discipline the market imposes.62 
There are some notable contributions to the literature on market discipline that do not fit this 
paradigm.  Mark Roe, for example, has explicitly recognized that banks and other financial 
institutions should be particularly adept at imposing discipline on other banks.63  Roe’s analysis, 
however, focuses solely on financial institutions as counterparties to derivative transactions, 
leading him to argue that special protections the Bankruptcy Code grants such parties gut their 
                                                                                                                                                       
Hazard: The Long-Lasting Legacy of Bailouts, 65 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 17, 21 (2009) (advocating 
subordinated debt); Macey & Garrett, supra note 25, at 215; Mark E. Van Der Weide & Satish M. Kini, 
Subordinated Debt: A Capital Markets Approach to Bank Regulation, 41 B.C. L. REV. 195 (2000). 
 59. Forssbæck, supra note 25. 
 60. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need 
for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (2011) (arguing that banks should 
be required to issue “contingent capital,” that is, debt that converts to equity); Charles W. Calomiris & 
Richard J. Herring, Why and How to Design a Contingent Convertible Debt Requirement (Working 
Paper, 2011) (arguing same); Douglas D. Evanoff, Preferred Sources of Market Discipline, 10 YALE J. 
ON REG. 347, 355–59 (1993) (arguing for “increased reliance . . . on subordinated debt holders” as the 
best way to increase the efficacy of market discipline”); William Poole, supra note 57, at 22–23 (2009) 
(arguing same). 
 61. WALLISON, supra note 58, at 2–3; Macey & Garrett, supra note 25. 
 62. E.g., Jose A. Lopez, Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Disclosure as a Supervisory Tool: Pillar 3 of 
Basel II, at 1 (FRBSF Econ. Letter 2003-22, 2003) (“The principle underlying Pillar 3 is that improved 
public disclosure of relevant information should enhance market discipline and hence its potential 
usefulness to bank supervisors.”); Robert P. Bartlett, III, Making Banks Transparent, 65 VAND. L. REV. 
293 (2012) (describing the disclosure requirements currently imposed on U.S. banks and calling for 
particular types of disclosure requirements as a means of improving market discipline); Albert J. Boro, 
Jr., Banking Disclosure Regimes for Regulating Speculative Behavior, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 431 (1986) 
(advocating the value of disclosure). 
 63. Roe, supra note 10, at 555−57. 
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economic incentive to meaningfully discipline one another.64  Other scholars have also 
recognized that banks may be uniquely effective as monitors of other banks, but most similarly 
suggest that some policy change is required to give banks adequate incentives to monitor and 
discipline one another.65  A related limitation is that many pieces in this vein were written at the 
early stages of the transformation in banking, and thus they necessarily fail to appreciate the full 
range and magnitude of relationships connecting today’s complex banks.66 
While interested in many of the same benefits long associated with market discipline, this 
Article takes a different approach to the topic, one that complements, rather than challenges, 
much of the existing literature.67  As an initial matter, it is less concerned with trying to figure 
out how to improve market discipline than it is with drawing attention to a meaningful source of 
discipline the market is already imposing.  More importantly, in focusing on the role that banks 
play in disciplining other banks, it makes two moves that are atypical in the literature.  First, it 
suggests that we should look past the nature of a stakeholder’s claim in a bank to consider the 
nature of the stakeholder.  Second, it suggests that we should consider a stakeholder’s aggregate 
exposure to a bank when assessing that stakeholder’s incentive to monitor and discipline a 
bank’s risk taking. 
                                                                                                                                                       
 64. Id. at 541−42. 
 65. E.g., Charles W. Calomiris, Blueprints for a New Global Financial Architecture, in 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBALIZATION 259, 270−72 (Leonardo 
Auernhermier ed., 2000) (proposing that banks be required to issue debt that must be held by other 
reputable banks); Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-
Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411 (2011) (arguing for the creation of formal self-regulatory 
organizations based upon banks’ presumed efficacy at monitoring one another). 
 66. E.g., David G. Oedel, Private Interbank Discipline, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 327, 330 
(1993) (suggesting that “private interbank discipline is a rare phenomenon in the United States,” but that 
it is one that has a long history, and providing examples); Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Interbank 
Lending and Systemic Risk, 28 J. OF MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 733 (1996) (providing theoretical 
support for the capacity of banks to monitor each other but focusing on short-term interbank loans as the 
primary source of credit exposure). 
 67. The other body of literature related to this Article is that focused on the interbank lending 
market.  Certain contributions to that literature are relevant and are examined further below.  See Part 
III.A, infra.  For the most part, however, that literature tends to focus exclusively on short-term loans 
among banks, which is just one component of the interbank exposures here described, and the 
contributions made often draw attention to the role of the interbank market in transmitting liquidity 
shortages.  See, e.g., Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti & Douglas Gale, Interbank Market Liquidity and 
Central Bank Intervention, 56 J. OF MONETARY ECON. 639 (2009); Xavier Freixas, Bruno Parigi & Jean-
Charles Rochet, Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations, and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank, 32 J. OF 
MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 611 (2000); Viral V. Acharya, Denis Gromb & Tanju Yorulmazer, 
Imperfect Competition in the Interbank Market for Liquidity as a Rationale for Central Banking 
(INSEAD Working Paper No. 2011/41/FIN, 2011); Franklin Allen et al., Transmission of Bank Liquidity 
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There are drawbacks to shifting away from the established paradigm.  One rationale 
underlying the tendency to focus on an identifiable class of stakeholders is that the degree of 
governmental and other protections vary depending upon the nature of a stakeholder’s interest in 
a bank.  As just discussed, depositors are presumed to impose little discipline to the extent their 
interests are protected by an explicit government guarantee.  Similarly, many counterparties are 
protected by certain preferences under the Bankruptcy Code and may benefit from further 
contractual protections.68  Using a bank’s aggregate economic exposure to another bank as a 
proxy for its economic interest in that bank’s financial well-being elides these (at times, quite 
significant) distinctions. 
At the same time, the proposed approach offers a number of advantages.  Most importantly, 
it allows us to identify a meaningful source of market discipline that is not captured in the 
prevailing paradigm.  Looking at a bank’s aggregate credit exposure to another bank reveals that 
the magnitude of its economic interest in that bank’s financial well-being is far greater than one 
would expect looking at any individual source of exposure.  This move is justified by the fact 
that banks themselves increasingly consider and seek to control their aggregate credit exposure 
to other individual banks, and soon will be required to do so.69  Thus, aggregate exposures 
provide a reasonable, even if imperfect, proxy for banks’ economic exposures to one another.  
Additionally, because of operational and other risks arising from their interconnectedness, banks 
may have reasons to monitor other banks apart from their credit exposures to those banks.70  Yet 
another advantage of focusing on banks rather than a particular stakeholder class is that banks, as 
banks, may have institutional advantages that make them more effective disciplinarians than 
other market participants.71 
Finally, and in connection with the above, this Article’s focus on interbank discipline helps 
demonstrate that the effects of market discipline are not solely positive from a social welfare 
perspective.  While this has been recognized with respect to stockholders, the possibility that 
market discipline could create ex ante incentives that increase systemic risk has been less 
appreciated with respect to other stakeholders.  The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
                                                                                                                                                       
Shocks in Loan and Deposit Markets: The Role of Interbank Borrowing and Market Monitoring (Wharton 
Fin. Insts. Ctr., Working Paper 10-28, 2012). 
 68. E.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(17), 362(b)(27), 560 (2006) (providing derivatives and repurchase 
agreement counterparties the right to liquidate collateral in their possession). 
 69. Lending Limits, supra note 7, at 37,268; Enhanced Prudential Standards, supra note 7, at 
600. 
 70. See infra Part III.B. 
60:5 Judge DRAFT  
(2/11/13 12:13 PM) Page 20 UCLA Law Review 
for example, advocates market discipline precisely because it believes that “[m]arket discipline 
imposes strong incentives on banks to conduct their business in a safe, sound and efficient 
manner.”72  Close examination of interbank discipline casts doubt on whether this assumption 
always holds.73  Having established why interbank discipline may merit attention, the next Part 
considers the role that it plays in financial markets today. 
II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERBANK DISCIPLINE 
This Part looks at three components which collectively suggest that banks play a meaningful 
role disciplining other banks: (a) an economic incentive to do so, (b) risk management systems 
that enable banks to monitor their exposure to other banks and to meaningfully assess the 
creditworthiness of those banks, and (c) mechanisms through which banks can alter their 
behavior in ways that affect the disciplined bank when its risk profile changes.  The claim 
throughout is not that banks are perfect disciplinarians. There are numerous indications that they 
are not. Rather, the aim of this Part is to establish that interbank discipline is sufficiently 
meaningful to merit consideration as we try to determine how best to allocate inherently finite 
resources.  It concludes with a brief discussion of the relevance of the Crisis. 
A. Incentives 
As banking has evolved, so has the numerosity and magnitude of a typical complex bank’s 
relationships with other banks.  Until recently, regulation, or lack thereof, facilitated the growth 
of interbank exposures.  While regulators have long imposed limitations on a bank’s capacity to 
become overly exposed to a particular firm, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), a leading bank regulator, construed those limits not to apply to loans between banks 
starting in 1963.74  Other regulations applicable to banks, specifically the risk-weighted capital 
adequacy requirements required pursuant to Basel II, contributed to the tendency of banks to 
become more interconnected by according loans to other banks an exceptionally low risk 
weighting.75  Regulations have been adopted since that time to limit interbank lending, but the 
standard limits did not apply when the loans were to a bank that was adequately capitalized, a 
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limitation revealed to have limited bite by the Crisis.76  Moreover, prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, 
these limits applied solely to loans and similar transactions, thus failing to incorporate credit risk 
arising from repos, reverse repos, securities lending transactions, securities borrowing 
transactions, and derivative transactions.  The Act requires that the rules on interbank limits be 
revised to include these additional sources of credit risk.77  The Act also imposes new limitations 
on interbank exposures and authorizes regulators to impose more stringent limitations than the 
Act requires.  Nonetheless, the new regulations have not yet been finalized and remain the 
subject of ongoing resistance by the leading banks.78  As a result, banks may have credit 
exposures to one another in excess of their credit exposures to other types of firms, and the 
limitations that will be imposed on interbank exposures remains uncertain. 
Publicly available information about banks’ risk exposures reflect the magnitude of 
interbank activity.  As both Bank of America and Goldman Sachs have stated, “While our 
activities expose us to many different industries and counterparties, we routinely execute a high 
volume of transactions with counterparties in the financial services industry . . . . This has 
resulted in significant credit concentration with respect to this industry.”79 
The actual figures are striking.  For example, 28 percent of Citigroup’s corporate loan 
portfolio—a portfolio that exceeds its aggregate consumer loan portfolio, including home loans 
and credit cards—consists of loans or commitments to banks, investment banks or other financial 
institutions.80  Citigroup’s next most significant areas of exposure are governments and central 
banks (at 12 percent) and petroleum (at 5 percent).81  Finance companies, including but not 
limited to banks, have accounted for 29.23 percent to 37.38 percent of the Goldman Sachs’ total 
credit exposure every year from 2009 through 2011, the only years for which they have provided 
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such information.82  J.P. Morgan, which remains very active in providing traditional services to 
consumers, similarly has exceptionally significant credit exposures to other banks and finance 
companies.  At the end of 2011, J.P. Morgan’s aggregate credit exposure to banks and other 
financial institutions was over $71 billion, and that figure exceeds $130 billion if other types of 
finance companies are included.83  Economic exposures of this magnitude provide these banks 
with a very strong economic incentive to ensure that the exposures do not result in correspondent 
losses. 
Significantly, the examples provided are representative of the exposures of most leading 
complex banks.  The Annual Reports on Form 10-K filed by Bank of America, Citigroup, J.P. 
Morgan & Co., the Goldman Sachs Group, and Morgan Stanley for the preceding five years 
reveal that finance companies (including, but not limited to, banks) are the top industry exposure 
the majority of the time, and are consistently near the top even when not first.84  Other leading 
sources of credit risk include real estate, government (including central banks), and, to a lesser 
degree, health care, consumer products, and services and energy.85 
Recently released information about the credit exposures between particular banks provides 
further evidence that banks have significant economic interests in the well-being of other banks.  
While no individual bank discloses this information, banks are in the process of resisting a 
proposal by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) to prevent 
the largest complex banks from having credit exposure to any single counterparty in excess of 
ten percent of the bank’s regulatory capital.86  To bolster their claims regarding the 
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unreasonableness of the proposed rule, trade associations representing the banking industry have 
compiled and released information demonstrating how far current practices deviate from the 
proposed standard.87  Preliminary results of a study of interbank exposures, which used data from 
thirteen banking organizations, revealed “100 exposures to 29 unique counterparties in excess of 
the applicable credit limit.”88  Moreover, the study found that “the average counterparty exposure 
for those excesses would be 248% of the applicable credit limit.”89  These figures demonstrate 
that the leading complex banks have significant economic exposures to other individual complex 
banks.  To emphasize just how drastically the proposed rule would alter bank activity, the trade 
associations assert that the “10% credit limit imposed on major covered companies—and even 
the 25% credit limit imposed on all covered companies [mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act]—
may severely restrict legitimate and economically desirable credit-related business,” and “[t]o 
comply with the proposed requirements, the provision of some credit products and services may 
have to be reduced significantly.”90  While the parties making these assertions clearly are not 
disinterested and objective, the banks and those lobbying on their behalf would have little reason 
to undertake such efforts if complex banks did not typically have credit exposures to one another 
far in excess of the proposed limits.  A bank with even a ten percent exposure to another bank 
could face incredibly significant difficulties if the other bank failed, suggesting that these bank-
to-bank exposures give banks a powerful, self-interested reason to monitor and respond to risk 
taking by other banks. 
There are limitations inherent in the data available, arising in significant part from the lack 
of directly relevant disclosure requirements.91  Combined with the related challenges of limited 
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historical data and banks’ various and evolving methodologies for measuring credit risk from 
sources other than loans, the ability to do historical analyses and cross-bank comparisons is 
limited.  At the same time, the limited nature of the data may itself support this Article’s main 
claim.  Banks cannot disclose what they do not themselves know.  The increasing tendency of 
banks to provide increasingly thorough information about their credit exposure despite the lack 
of any change in the applicable requirements may indicate that it is only recently that banks’ risk 
management systems have become sufficiently sophisticated for them to accurately measure and 
aggregate credit exposures.92 
Moreover, banks’ self-interested reasons for being concerned about the financial well-being 
of other banks goes beyond the credit exposures captured in the preceding measures.  Banks, for 
example, frequently act as market makers and otherwise trade in a range of securities and other 
instruments.93  This creates settlement risk, as one party will often have to deliver the asset or 
payment before receipt of the consideration owed by the other side (creating a risk of loss if the 
other party fails in the interim).94  As one treatise explains, settlement risk is “especially” 
problematic in “interbank markets because the volume of interbank payments is extremely high,” 
particularly when viewed “in relation to the capital set aside by each bank.”95  Recall as well that 
complex banks, often also provide “clearing, custodial and prime brokerage services for financial 
services companies.”96  These activities pose relatively limited credit risk but, as J.P. Morgan 
acknowledged, they give rise to potential “operational and litigation costs,” should the financial 
service company for whom the services are provided face financial distress.97  Today’s complex 
banks thus not only have significant credit exposure to other banks, but they also have other self-
interested reasons to be concerned about the financial well-being of other banks. 
B. Risk Management Systems 
Having established that banks have the requisite incentives, the next question is whether 
banks have the tools necessary to monitor other banks and to make meaningful assessments of 
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the risks to which those banks are exposed.  Evidence suggests that they do, and that their 
capacity in both of these regards is likely to continue to improve in the years ahead.98 
Risk management is a multitiered undertaking for most banks.  A closer look at J.P. 
Morgan’s system for understanding and limiting its credit exposures illustrates.  The firm has a 
Chief Risk Officer who oversees its risk management program, which “works in partnership with 
the business segments in identifying and aggregating exposures across all lines of business.”99  
The firm also has extensive “policies and practices . . . to ensure credit risks are assessed 
accurately, approved properly, monitored regularly and managed actively at both the transaction 
and portfolio levels.”100  This includes monitoring its “[w]holesale credit risk [discussed above] 
regularly at an aggregate portfolio, industry and individual counterparty basis with established 
concentration limits that are reviewed and revised, as deemed appropriate by management, 
typically on an annual basis.”101  Its “[i]ndustry and counterparty limits” are “measured in terms 
of exposure and economic credit risk capital,” and “are subject to stress-based loss 
constraints.”102  As this makes clear, J.P. Morgan has systems in place to understand its 
aggregate economic exposure to other banks, and it manages those exposures at multiple levels. 
The firm has also instituted a number of governance mechanisms designed to promote 
effective risk management.  At the highest levels, the bank’s “CEO is responsible for setting the 
overall risk appetite of the Firm.”  The firm also has two committees of its board of directors—
the Risk Policy Committee and the Audit Committee—which play active roles in monitoring the 
firm’s risk management policies and the implementation thereof.  To ensure that the policies set 
by senior management are carried out and that senior management is informed when issues arise, 
the firm has instituted an internal governance regime involving multiple layers of committees 
designed to promote regular communication between the firm’s Risk Working Group and each 
of the firm’s other divisions.103  Overlaying these specific mechanisms, the firm claims to 
promote “a culture of risk awareness and personal responsibility . . . where collaboration, 
discussion, escalation and sharing of information is encouraged.”104  What is most remarkable 
about J.P. Morgan’s sophisticated, resource-intensive risk management system is that it is not all 
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that remarkable.  J.P. Morgan has a long history of being at the forefront of credit risk 
management, so it may have an exceptionally strong risk management system in practice, but the 
description here is consistent with the risk management regimes in place at most complex 
banks.105 
There are also external checks on the robustness of banks’ risk management systems.  Most 
notably, a primary aim of bank examiners is to ensure that the banks they oversee have adequate 
risk management systems.  With respect to a bank’s credit-administration procedures, for 
example, the Federal Reserve (another leading bank examiner) expects its examiners to: 
determine that the bank regularly reviews the creditworthiness of its counterparties, “[a]ssess 
whether management has demonstrated an ability to identify downgrades in creditworthiness 
between reviews,” “[d]etermine if credit-risk-management staff demonstrate an ability to work 
out of positions with counterparties whose credit quality has deteriorated,” “[d]etermine whether 
management considered the full range of exposures when establishing capital-at-risk exposures,” 
and “[c]heck that limits are in place for counterparties before transacting a deal,” among other 
things.106  To facilitate such exhaustive reviews, bank examiners are given inside access to a 
bank’s documentation and personnel.107  Such reviews are meant to be sufficiently robust to 
enable an examiner to reach meaningful conclusions about each bank’s risk management 
systems.  Among other things, the Federal Reserve expects its examiners to: “determine if the 
institution’s credit-risk-measurement system has been correctly implemented and adequately 
measures the institution’s credit risks,” “determine if the institution has implemented adequate 
policies and procedures that are sufficiently calibrated to the risk profiles of particular types of 
counterparties and instruments,” and “ensure the comprehensiveness, accuracy, and integrity of 
management information systems that analyze credit exposures.”108  In short, bank examiners are 
expected to inspect, and second guess the efficacy of, every aspect of a bank’s risk management 
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system.  While not a perfect fail-safe, the very process of requiring a bank to explain and justify 
the adequacy of its risk management system to an inquisitive and powerful third party provides 
an important additional check on the robustness of such systems.109 
To be sure, the claim here is not that banks do a perfect job of identifying and accurately 
assessing the magnitude of risks to which other banks are exposed.  Banks all too often fail to 
accurately assess their own risk exposures, as illustrated all too well by J.P. Morgan’s “London 
Whale” debacle—a series of transactions intended to be part of the bank’s efforts to manage its 
risk, which resulted in nearly $6 billion in losses and forced the bank to admit to a “material 
weakness” in its internal controls for failing to catch inflated valuations that the traders placed 
upon the transactions.110  Market participants—like regulators—at times make mistakes.  
Nonetheless, it is clear that banks devote substantial resources to monitoring and responding to 
risk taking at other banks and financial institutions.  In so doing, they likely develop a 
meaningful, even if flawed and incomplete, understanding of other banks’ risk exposures. 
C. Imposing Discipline 
The third and final component supporting the power of interbank discipline is a mechanism 
through which a revised assessment by one bank (the disciplining bank) of the risks posed by 
another bank (the disciplined bank) alter the disciplining bank’s activities in a way that affects 
the disciplined bank.  The disciplined bank need not know it is being disciplined, but it must feel 
the effect.  As a general matter, a stakeholder that becomes concerned about a bank’s risk 
exposures can respond in one of two ways—it can exercise contractual, voting or other rights it 
may possess to try to change the bank’s activities or it can reduce its economic exposure to the 
bank.  Banks discipline each other almost exclusively through the latter of these two 
mechanisms.  Even that process, however, is not straightforward.  This section focuses on credit 
risk and then considers other bases for interbank discipline. 
A primary way that banks respond to the perceived riskiness of other banks is through credit 
limits.  As a disciplining bank’s assessment of the risk profile of another bank changes, the 
maximum exposure the disciplining bank is willing to assume with respect to that bank should 
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change accordingly.  Limits are usually set at multiple levels, including firm-wide limits and 
limits on the aggregate credit exposure that might arise from a particular division or in 
connection with a particular type of transaction.111  As the disciplining bank revises its 
assessment of the risks posed by the disciplined bank, it revises these limits accordingly, and 
makes corresponding changes in its actual credit exposures to that bank.  A disciplining bank can 
reduce its actual credit exposure to the disciplined bank by refusing to extend new loans or enter 
into new agreements with the bank, terminating existing arrangements, and seeking to exit 
current arrangements by assigning them to a third party.112  Holding everything else constant, the 
effect should be to reduce the disciplined bank’s operations and operating revenue.  While the 
magnitude of this effect may be small when viewed in isolation, the aggregate effect of 
numerous banks making similar changes in their dealings with the disciplined bank can be 
significant.113 
The analysis, however, cannot end there because disciplining banks can and do use other 
means for reducing credit exposures.  The disciplining bank often will, for example, seek to 
further reduce its exposure indirectly through hedging.  Credit default swaps (CDS) effectively 
enable a bank (or any other firm) to insure itself against loss should a specified bank (or other 
firm) fail.  By entering into CDS referencing the disciplined bank, a disciplining bank may 
reduce (or eliminate) its effective exposure to that bank.  Doing so imposes a cost on the 
disciplining bank, as it must pay a premium, commonly referred to as the “spread,” in exchange 
for the insurance policy.  Hedging also affects the disciplined bank.  Market participants and 
regulators alike recognize that the spread on CDS referencing a bank is indicative of a bank’s 
financial well-being.114  When the disciplining bank hedges its exposure, it increases demand for 
CDS referencing the disciplined bank, increasing the spread on CDS referencing the bank, and 
thus sending a signal that the bank is marginally riskier than it appeared to be prior to the 
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hedge.115  Increases in CDS spreads also impose direct costs on disciplined banks by increasing 
the interest a bank must pay on short-term and other loans.116 
Yet another way that banks reduce their effective credit exposure to other banks is through 
collateral arrangements.  To the extent an exposure is collateralized, a bank reduces its potential 
loss upon the bankruptcy of the other bank by the value of the collateral.  This protection can be 
particularly valuable for banks when acting as counterparties to derivative transactions because 
of special protections provided by the Bankruptcy Code.117 
Like hedging, using collateral to reduce effective exposure entails transaction costs and 
often imposes additional costs on both banks.  When a bank is required to post collateral, the 
bank loses the ability to use the asset so committed for other productive purposes.  To the extent 
that a bank is required to post high-quality, highly liquid collateral, as is often the case, the bank 
faces proportionately greater liquidity constraints and has fewer liquid assets with which to 
pursue other opportunities.  Even a contingent commitment to post collateral can be very costly 
for a bank, as the disciplined bank must alter its operations in a way that ensures it will have 
adequate satisfactory collateral in the event that the contingency arises.118  Correspondingly, the 
disciplined bank required to post collateral may demand better terms to compensate for these 
disadvantages, imposing potential costs on the disciplining bank.  The disciplining bank also 
faces challenges with respect to monitoring and enforcing contingent rights to demand collateral.  
A final challenge is that the value of collateral can change.  Even collateral that appears to be 
high quality and highly liquid (as most AAA-rated, mortgage-backed securities appeared to be 
before the Crisis) may prove to be otherwise, and true high quality assets may be in short 
supply.119 
In practice, a bank seeking to reduce its exposure to another bank often uses all three of 
these mechanisms in varying degrees.  At time, banks will also seek to be compensated for extra 
credit risk in other ways, like higher interest rates or otherwise demanding more favorable terms.  
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A disciplining bank also may utilize other mechanisms, like guarantees, to reduce the probability 
of loss should a bank to which it is exposed fail.  The extent that a disciplining bank relies on 
each of these mechanisms involves complex cost-benefit tradeoffs, which are further influenced 
by intrafirm institutional dynamics.  Interactions between how a bank sets its aggregate exposure 
limits, the limits it imposes with respect to particular transaction types or divisions, and the 
mechanisms it uses to enforce such limitations and otherwise compel divisions and persons 
inside the bank to internalize the cost of their actions all influence a bank’s use of these various 
responses. 
The key for the analysis here is that a bank cannot reduce its exposure to another bank in a 
way that is costless to both banks.  Virtually all actions that the disciplining bank may take to 
reduce its credit exposure impose costs on the disciplined bank and many also entail costs for the 
disciplining bank.  Because of the associated costs, banks do not generally use collateral and 
other forms of hedging to eliminate their credit exposure to other banks completely.  Data 
released by J.P. Morgan, for example, show that the firm hedged between 12.22 percent and 
19.54 percent of its exposure to all financial companies in the years 2007 to 2011.120  Similarly, 
at the end of 2011, Citigroup economically hedged 10 percent of its credit exposures to banks 
and broker-dealers, and 5 percent of its credit exposure to insurance and special purpose 
vehicles; those figures were 7 percent and 4 percent, respectively, a year earlier.121  Because 
disciplining banks seek to minimize the costs they incur, the majority of these costs should fall 
upon disciplined banks.  Similarly, when a bank changes its activities and risk profile in a way 
that makes working with that bank more appealing to other banks, other banks should respond by 
increasing their credit limits with respect to that bank, reducing their reliance on hedging and 
collateral, and otherwise dealing with the bank on more favorable terms. 
Finally, banks’ efforts to address the operational risks, as well as other risks arising from 
interbank, activity provide yet other mechanisms for penalizing and rewarding other banks based 
upon their risk profiles.  For example, recall that J.P. Morgan provides clearing and settlement 
services for a large number of banks and other financial institutions.  In this role, it effectively 
stands between buyers and sellers of securities, facilitating the transfer of the securities and 
moneys paid for them.  This is one of the activities that gives rise to operational, litigation and 
other risks.  The Wall Street Journal—in the lead article in its Money & Investing section—
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recently reported that J.P. Morgan has undertaken a review of the clearing services it provides to 
banks and other financial institutions, with the aim of “dialing back services to some clients and 
severing ties with others.”122  Notably, it is not reducing the services it provides across the board.  
J.P. Morgan makes a lot of money from providing such services: “[N]et income at the unit was 
$463 million in the second quarter” of 2012, 9 percent of the bank’s profits for the quarter —so it 
doesn’t want to scale back excessively.123  Instead, the firm is engaging in complex cost-benefit 
analyses, which take into account its assessments of the downside risks to which various firms 
are exposed.124  The publication and prominent positioning of the article—even before J.P. 
Morgan has made any public announcements about the changes—reflects the economic 
significance of such changes to the institutions affected. 
The preceding three sections collectively describe a system in which banks are under 
constant oversight by other banks. Numerous banks, all doing business with a bank, regularly 
assess that bank’s risk profile.  As they do, the disciplining banks adjust their willingness to work 
with the disciplined bank and alter their behavior accordingly.  All of these processes are 
dynamic and iterative, increasing the probability that assessments and responses will increasingly 
reflect the disciplined bank’s actual risk exposures over time.  Further increasing the accuracy of 
the system as a whole is the sheer number of participants.  Interbank discipline is not the product 
of one bank’s assessment of another.  Rather, its power lies in the judgments that many banks are 
constantly making about one another.  These decisions may have only small effects on the 
disciplined bank, if viewed in isoliation, but can have significant effects in the aggregate.  By 
rewarding banks that alter their risk profiles in ways that make them attractive from a credit risk 
perspective and penalizing those that do the opposite, interbank discipline provides immediate, 
material benefits and costs to banks in accord with their risk profiles.  Interbank discipline thus 
incentivizes banks to change how they do business in some troubling ways. 
D. A Note About the Crisis 
The Crisis has been viewed by many as evidence of the utter failure of the market, and 
hence of the error of relying upon market discipline.  Even former Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve, Alan Greenspan expressed “shocked disbelief” that “the self-interest of lending 
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institutions to protect shareholders’ equity” was not sufficient to prevent the Crisis.125  This sub-
Part explains why the Crisis and other apparent market failures change the lens that we should 
use for understanding market discipline, but do not undermine the importance of considering the 
effects of market discipline in the regulation of banks. 
The most important reason why the Crisis does not undermine the importance of interbank 
discipline relates to the appropriate basis for comparison.  If the question is whether banks 
perfectly monitor other banks, the answer is clearly no.  Bank opacity prevents other banks from 
developing a perfect understanding of the risks to which a bank is exposed.  Moreover, because 
of the costs associated with obtaining and processing information and the fallibility of the human 
beings who carry out risk management on banks’ behalf, disciplining banks would almost 
certainly fail to incorporate perfect information even if it were available.  To suggest that 
interbank market discipline merits attention does not, however, require that banks do a perfect 
job.  All of those engaged in monitoring and assessing bank risk taking—including bank 
examiners, credit rating agencies, and other market participants—have regularly failed to 
identify banks on the verge of failure and have otherwise erred in their assessments of the risks 
posed by particular institutions.  Policy choices are inevitably choices among imperfect 
alternatives interbank discipline may be both flawed and yet sufficiently powerful that its effects 
should be taken into account in determining how best to allocate finite government resources.  
Moreover, recognizing market discipline as significant need not mean abdicating regulatory 
oversight completely.  Thus, once we recognize that the discipline banks impose on one another 
affects their risk taking behavior—and the analysis up to this point supports that conclusion—the 
question then shifts to the lessons to learn from it. 
There are, however, additional reasons that the Crisis does not undermine this Article’s 
claims regarding the power and efficacy of interbank discipline.  As an initial matter, most 
banks’ current risk management practices are significantly more robust than those in place prior 
to the Crisis.  Credit risk management practices are continually improving in general and the 
Crisis substantially accelerated this process.  Regulatory changes adopted in the wake of the 
Crisis provide further impetus for firms to improve their risk management practices.  The Federal 
Reserve, for example, has proposed new rules designed to ensure the robustness of banks’ 
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enterprise risk management systems and has mandated that large banks have risk management 
committees.  The Financial Stability Oversight Council has similarly issued recommendations 
directing senior bank officials to institute “strong risk management and reporting structures,” and 
to “establish clear accountability for failures of risk management.”126  The record low levels of 
bank failures in the period before the Crisis may have lulled banks into a false sense of 
complacency, and that does point to a significant challenge inherent in interbank discipline, that 
is, the risk that it will be cyclical, imposing the least discipline when it is most needed. 
Nonetheless, banks today are more attuned to the risks posed by interbank exposures than they 
were leading into the Crisis. 
There is also reason to believe that many banks had fairly robust risk management systems 
already in place.  Banks may have grossly overestimated the strength of the real estate market 
while underestimating the risks posed by securitized instruments tied to it, but the Crisis itself 
cannot be wholly attributed to flaws in banks’ systems for monitoring and managing their 
exposures to other banks.  Banks’ interests and society’s interests are not synonymous—
government bailouts benefit banks even yet are socially costly.127  To the consternation of many, 
the great majority of complex banks survived the Crisis, with many recording substantial profits, 
and paying out correspondingly sizeable bonuses, while the rest of the economy only slowly 
recovered from the myriad challenges the Crisis created.128 
Additionally, some of the most significant developments in the Crisis were precipitated, in 
part, by interbank discipline.  The failure of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, for example, 
have been attributed in significant part to other banks’ refusals to provide the troubled banks 
financing or to engage in other transactions with them on sufficiently favorable terms.129  
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Similarly, the collateral demands that Goldman Sachs made upon AIG played a critical role in 
precipitating its need for a government bailout.130  In each instance, it was the market, not 
regulators, who identified the relevant firm as troubled and took actions that penalized it 
accordingly.  These examples illustrate a significant challenge inherent in market-imposed 
discipline:  It can be imposed in dramatic ways that at times exacerbate problems rather than 
prevent them.  Such challenges are inherent in market discipline and are important factors to 
consider in determining the appropriate policy responses to it, but they are not a reason to ignore 
its power.131 
III. BANKS AS DISCIPLINARIANS 
This Part looks at the institutional competence and incentives of banks with respect to the 
discipline they impose on other banks.  It thus moves past the core aim of this Article—drawing 
attention to the power of interbank discipline—to the effects of that discipline.  In revealing 
problematic effects of interbank discipline and variability in its efficacy, this Part also illustrates 
why this Article advocates a complementarity approach in responding to interbank discipline. 
The complementarity approach advocated here shares certain assumptions with the two 
approaches generally endorsed by advocates of market discipline, that is, deregulation and belt-
and-suspenders style duplication.  It shares the assumption inherent in the deregulatory response 
that when the market is performing a task well, we should reduce, perhaps significantly, the 
regulatory resources devoted to it.  It also shares the pragmatic view underlying the belt-and-
suspenders approach that no regulator or market participant is ever going to be perfect, and the 
stability of the financial system is a sufficiently valuable social good that some duplication may 
be warranted.132  The complementarity approach differs from these established approaches in 
suggesting that we should also consider the relative institutional advantages of regulators and 
market participants in assessing the significance of interbank discipline on the establishment of 
regulatory priorities.  Two institutional dimensions merit particular attention—competence and 
incentives.  Competence matters because understanding what banks do well, and what regulators 
might do better, sheds light on how best to allocate finite regulatory resources in light of the 
discipline the market imposes.  Incentives matter because to the extent there is a disparity 
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between the incentives of banks, as the relevant market participants, and the activity that would 
maximize social welfare, regulatory intervention may be needed to counter the effects of the 
disparity or to fill gaps that remain.  This Part discusses each of these issues with respect to the 
role that banks play in disciplining each other.  The next Part addresses both with respect to 
regulators. 
A. Institutional Competence 
The primary reason banks are likely to be effective disciplinarians lies in the power of 
economic incentives.133  Regulators may lose prestige if they fail, but bank examiners are rarely 
fired for making mistakes, and the regulator that employs them is unlikely to go bankrupt as a 
result of their errors.  The same is not true for banks.  The sheer size of banks’ economic 
exposures to one another gives them a powerful economic interest in understanding the risks to 
which other banks are exposed and protecting themselves as appropriate.  Moreover, one way 
that risk management has improved in the wake of the Crisis is through the creation of new 
mechanisms for ensuring that senior officials play a more active role in risk management.134  As 
a result, agency costs within banks that may undermine the efficacy of risk management systems 
should be more tightly constrained than they have been in the past. 
Closely related to banks’ economic incentives to be good disciplinarians is their capacity to 
hire the best and the brightest personnel available.  Banks are not subject to constraints in the 
compensation they can provide, and the high levels of compensation typical at many banks helps 
them attract exceptionally capable personnel.135  Moreover, some leading banks, like Goldman 
Sachs, are known for moving personnel between trading desks and risk management positions, 
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as well as doing the reverse.136  Such personnel movements can facilitate good working 
relationships between risk management departments and other divisions, in addition to further 
enhancing the ability of banks to attract highly capable individuals into risk management 
positions. 
Yet another reason that banks may be effective disciplinarians is that they are analyzing 
entities that are like themselves.  Banks, for example, understand the financial reporting 
requirements imposed on banks because they themselves must comply with the same.  This gives 
banks an advantage in analyzing another bank’s financial statements, enabling insights into 
which figures are likely to be reliable, which are likely to involve more judgment (and be subject 
to gaming), what small changes in a bank’s financial position might signal problems down the 
line, and other issues.  Such insights may be particularly valuable in light of the numerous 
judgment calls inherent in the process of financial reporting for today’s complex banks.137 
A related advantage possessed by banks relative to other market actors is that as active 
participants in the same markets, banks often have inside information about other banks’ 
activities and exposures.  In the years before the Crisis, for example, underwriters and those 
involved in packaging mortgages into mortgage-backed securities likely had a better 
understanding than most regarding which banks had become the most lax in their underwriting 
policies and practices.  Similarly, traders in a particular area often have a sense of who is buying 
what and on what terms.  Such signals can be noisy, particularly because banks may engage in 
activities to limit the capacity of third parties to deduce their trading strategies.  Nonetheless, 
imperfect information is still information and may be quite valuable, particularly when coupled 
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with a deep understanding of the relevant market and considered in light of the fact that banks 
are notoriously opaque institutions.138 
Yet another reason that banks may be particularly effective as disciplinarians lies in the 
overlap between the types of judgments required to assess another bank’s riskiness and the types 
of judgments banks must make in connection with other aspects of their operations.  For 
example, if a bank has a large commercial real estate portfolio or has made an aggressive bet on 
sovereign debt issued by countries in a particular region, assessing the riskiness of that bank 
requires a judgment to be made about the strength of the commercial real estate market or the 
countries issuing the debt.  Banks are already in the business of making these types of judgment 
calls and they have strong financial incentives—even apart from their interbank credit 
exposures—to ensure that these judgments are as accurate as possible.  This is one of the ways 
that banks may have advantages relative not just to other market participants, but relative to bank 
regulators as well. 
The evidence available supports the notion that banks may be effective disciplinarians.  For 
example, in a study examining the interest rates banks charge other banks for overnight loans, 
Craig Furgine finds that “banks with higher profitability, fewer problem loans, and higher capital 
ratios pay lower interest rates.”139  The Federal Reserve sets the target for such rates, and the 
daily average for the rates that banks charge each other is known as the effective federal funds 
rate, but the interest rate that any one bank charges another is determined entirely by the banks 
involved.  Based on his findings, Furgine concludes that the “price of a federal funds loan 
reflects, in part, the credit risk of the borrowing institution . . . suggest[ing] that banks can 
distinguish credit risk among their peers and price loan contracts accordingly.”140  Similarly, 
Gara Afonso and her co-authors found that immediately following Lehman Brothers’ 
bankruptcy, “large banks with high percentages of non-performing loans showed drastically 
reduced daily borrowing amounts and borrowed from fewer counterparties in the days after 
Lehman’s bankruptcy.”141  Based upon that finding and others, they conclude that their “results 
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lend support to the interpretation that heightened concerns about counterparty risk reduce[] 
liquidity and increase[] the cost of finance for weaker banks.”142 
Spreads on credit default swaps (CDS) referencing banks provide further evidence of 
interbank discipline.  The CDS spreads for both Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers went up 
significantly prior to their respective failures, and CDS spreads throughout the Crisis 
demonstrate significant bank-specific variation.143  As one of the primary mechanisms that banks 
use to manage their credit exposure to other banks, the degree of variation in CDS spreads likely 
reflects, at least in part, the effort banks devote to monitoring and managing their credit 
exposures to other banks.144 
At the same time, there are meaningful limitations on the efficacy of banks as 
disciplinarians.  Many flow from the incentive issues described below, but others arise from 
institutional and positional constraints.  Banks, for example, are never going to have the inside 
access afforded regulators, nor are they going to enjoy the broad set of remedial responses that 
regulators may employ.145  The key here is that there is reason to expect that banks may be 
highly effective in monitoring and responding to changes in other banks’ risk profiles. 
B. Incentives 
The reason that banks monitor and discipline one another is that banks have an economic 
interest in limiting their downside risk exposures to the extent it is cost effective to do so; it is 
not to maximize social welfare.  The two aims often overlap.  If a bank takes excessive risks, 
other banks should penalize it accordingly, thereby discouraging such behavior.  In those 
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circumstances, the discipline banks impose on one another fulfills the ideal of market discipline 
embodied in Basel and embraced by many of its proponents.  In general, when the issue is the 
quantum of risk that a bank is taking, the interests of banks and society are largely aligned—
excessive risk taking is bad for both. 
Moving past the question of whether a bank’s risk taking is excessive to consider the nature 
of the risks a bank is assuming, however, reveals that banks’ incentives may systematically 
deviate from the socially optimal in a number of regards.  As reflected in the Crisis, one 
significant source of divergence relates to liquidity risk.  The interbank market plays an 
important role helping to smooth access to liquidity during normal time.  At the same time, the 
interbank market can give rise to inefficiencies and may exacerbate liquidity contractions when 
signs of trouble arise.  These divergences between the outcomes that are socially optimal and 
those that would result in the absence of government intervention help to explain the existence 
and value of having a central bank that, among other things, can function as a lender of last 
resort.146  This Article examines other ways that banks’ incentives may systematically deviate 
from the socially optimal, focusing attention outside of crisis periods.  Three issues—systemic 
risk, tail risks, and correlated risks—merit particular attention, although more may well exist. 
1. Systemic Risk 
The most significant way that banks’ incentives vary from the socially optimal is in their 
relative concern with systemic risk.  Because of the large externalities associated with banking 
crises, banks and their stakeholders do not face optimal incentives to avoid systemic risk.147  The 
possibility of government intervention transforms this divergence into a source of moral 
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hazard.148  This means that as the probability that a bank’s failure will have systemic 
repercussions increases, so too does the magnitude of the disparity between a bank’s incentives 
and those that would maximize social welfare. 
That government bailouts can never be assured does not undermine the role that a possible 
bailout plays in other banks’ risk assessments.  A core function of risk management is to assign 
probabilities to various possible outcomes.  Government bailouts, and the situations in which 
they are provided, are sufficiently predictable that risk managers have long taken them into 
account when assessing a bank’s creditworthiness.  For example, when Moody’s assigns a credit 
rating to a bank, it engages in a two-step process.  First, it engages in a thorough analysis of the 
bank as a stand-alone entity and assigns it an initial rating on that basis.149  It then engages in a 
separate analysis in which it considers the probability that the bank will receive external support, 
including a government-funded bailout, if it faces financial distress.150  Moody’s then adjusts its 
rating accordingly.  Thus, the final rating given to any bank is the product of both the bank’s 
actual creditworthiness and Moody’s assessment of the probability that it would receive a 
bailout.151  A bank’s creditors, including other banks, make comparable adjustments to their 
analyses.152  Empirical evidence also reveals that banks are capable of very quickly revising their 
estimations of the probability of a bailout when new information comes to light, and that they 
rapidly adjust their willingness to work with other banks accordingly.153 
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The most well recognized way in which these dynamics become manifest, and the one for 
which there is the best empirical support, is the phenomenon of banks becoming “too big to fail.”  
Economists studying new bond issuances, for example, found that “[t]he larger the bank, the less 
its portfolio matters for explaining the spreads on its bonds.”154  The effect was particularly 
pronounced for banks that the government had previously indicated may be too big to fail.155  In 
other words, the market views some banks as likely being too big to fail and those banks are able 
to borrow at lower interest rate than they would otherwise have to pay as a result.  Recent studies 
on the relationship between a bank’s size and the spread on CDS referencing the bank provide 
further evidence that the market views some banks as too big to fail and this affects market 
participants’ willingness to assume credit risk with respect to a bank.156  A recent study places 
the value of the implicit government subsidy provided to the eighteen largest U.S. bank holding 
companies as a result of too-big-to-fail bailout expectations at over $34 billion per year.157 
Not surprisingly, there is also evidence that banks, aware of these benefits, actively seek to 
become too big to fail in order to enjoy the government subsidy lavished on such institutions.158  
A feedback loop thus exists.  If a bank knows it can extract better terms from creditors and others 
by increasing its probability of receiving a bailout, it will change itself to increase that 
probability, thereby enabling it to enjoy the current economic advantages that flow from that 
probabilistic change. Interbank relationships provide an important mechanism through which 
banks can enjoy immediate benefits from being viewed as a probable bailout recipient. 
Too big to fail remains a significant issue, but it is no longer the only one.  The Crisis made 
clear that the systemic significance of a bank’s collapse, and hence the likelihood of a 
government bailout, is not just a product of the bank’s size.  Systemic risk also increases when a 
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bank is “too interconnected to fail” or “too correlated to fail.”159  We can therefore expect that 
banks will also consider these characteristics in evaluating their relationships with other banks. 
When a bank enters into a contractual arrangement or otherwise engages with another bank, 
each bank increases its connectivity to the other.  The more connected a bank is to other banks, 
the greater the probability that its failure will have systemic consequences, and the greater the 
probability that the government will intervene to prevent its failure.  As a result, when Bank A is 
evaluating whether to enter into an arrangement with Bank B, Bank A may reasonably expect 
that the very process of creating that relationship increases the likelihood that the government 
would intervene in the event that either Bank A or Bank B faces financial difficulties.  The net 
result is that entering into the agreement benefits Bank A directly, by increasing the probability it 
will be bailed out, and indirectly, by reducing the magnitude of the credit risk it assumes in its 
dealing with Bank B (by also increasing the probability of Bank B being bailed out).  Thus, the 
resulting increased interconnectivity may itself increase Bank A’s incentive to enter into a 
relationship with Bank B. 
Similar dynamics arise with respect to correlated risk taking.  In the event that a bank fails 
for highly idiosyncratic reasons, regulators have little reason (apart from the two just mentioned) 
not to allow the bank to fail.  Regulators also have tools for limiting the systemic repercussions 
of such a failure.160  The situation changes dramatically, however, if numerous banks are 
exposed to a similar set of risks.  In determining whether to intervene if a common exposure 
proves problematic, the government must now consider the systemic significance of allowing all 
of the exposed banks fail when determining whether to intervene.  Thus, if Bank A is facing a 
choice between increasing its economic exposure to Bank B or Bank C and both banks are 
exposed to an identical amount of risk, Bank A should favor the bank with the risk profile that 
most resembles the risk profiles of other banks.  Once again, this effect is likely to lead to 
increased fragility.  Banks are rewarded for having risk profiles that resemble those of other 
banks, whereas the system would be more stable if banks assumed more idiosyncratic risks.161 
To be clear, there are two related issues that arise from the expectation that a government 
may bail out a bank when the systemic costs of its failure are sufficiently great.  As an initial 
                                                                                                                                                       
 159. Coffee, supra note 60, at 816. 
 160. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. II, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1442–1520 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–95). 
 161. E.g., Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 323 (2011) 
(describing the destructive potential that arises from banks assuming similar risks). 
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matter, banks themselves have an incentive to become more interconnected and to have risk 
exposures that are more closely correlated to other banks in order to increase the likelihood they 
will receive a bailout.  The second issue is that interbank discipline may exacerbate these 
tendencies by providing a mechanism through which banks can realize immediate economic 
benefits based on expectations of a bailout.  To the extent a bank grows, increases its 
connectivity, or alters the nature of its risk exposures in a way that increases the probability of a 
government bailout, those changes affect other banks’ assessments of that bank.  As a result, 
other banks should be relatively more willing to work with a bank when it changes its profile in 
any of these ways.  To be sure, this dynamic is not specific to other banks.  All of a bank’s 
creditors may be expected to adjust their expectations regarding the credit risk a bank poses to 
account for the possibility of a government bailout.162  Nonetheless, this problem may be 
particularly great in the context of interbank interactions.  Precisely because of the numerosity 
and diversity of the connections among banks, they can respond swiftly and effectively when 
another bank changes its risk profile in a way that affects the probability it will be bailed out.163  
Moreover, all of the factors suggesting that banks may be particularly adept at disciplining other 
banks also facilitate banks’ ability to detect changes in a bank’s risk profile that affect the 
probability it will receive a bailout. 
There are also specific reasons to expect that interbank discipline is more likely to 
contribute to correlated risk taking and increased interconnectivity than other forms of market 
discipline.  To assess how correlated a bank’s risk profile is to that of other banks, it is necessary 
to consider not just that bank’s risk profile, but also the risk profiles of other banks.  Because of 
the costs associated with obtaining and processing such information, few stakeholders will have 
an adequate incentive to engage in such an analysis.  By contrast, a typical complex bank has 
relationships with most other complex banks and thus already possesses the information 
necessary to reach such judgments.  Relatedly, interbank activity is the source of connectivity; it 
is the mechanism through which banks can exploit this subsidy. 
                                                                                                                                                       
 162. The dual nature of the problem inherent in bailout expectations is not unique to banking.  See, 
e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 956, 961–62 (2000) (explaining IMF’s intervention as creating moral hazard for 
countries); Charles W. Calomiris, The IMF’s Imprudent Role as Lender of Last Resort, 17 CATO J. at 
275, 277 (Winter 1998) (same). 
 163. See Fed, Capital-Markets Activities Manual, supra note 106, at 2020.1, 10 (stating that banks 
that are active dealers “should have counterparty credit exposure monitored daily”). 
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That banks’ incentives are not welfare optimizing is far from a new insight.  Nonetheless, 
the analysis here sheds new light onto the mechanisms through which the moral hazard arising 
from the possibility of a government bailout becomes manifest.  Even if very few banks are 
trying to exploit these dynamics today, that could change, and it could change quickly.  Banks 
operate in a highly competitive environment.  When one bank realizes that changing its 
operations in a particular way allows it to realize immediate gains while exposing it to only a 
limited portion of the associated downside risk, other banks are likely to follow.164  History is 
replete with examples of banks doing just that, even as their actions increase in the fragility of 
the financial system as a whole.165 
2. Tail Risks 
Banks’ incentives to alter their risk taking behavior and assessments of other banks to 
exploit implicit government subsidies are not the only way that interbank discipline may lead to 
socially suboptimal outcomes.  A second, and somewhat overlapping, way that banks’ risk 
management systems have proved wanting is with respect to their capacity to capture and 
appropriately measure tail risks.  Tail risks are low probability events which, if they arise, result 
in significant losses (or gains).166  A common theme in many accounts of the Crisis is that banks 
did not adequately seek to understand and limit their exposure to tail risks.167  A partial 
explanation for this failure is that one of the primary mechanisms banks used to manage risk 
exposures—Value at Risk (VaR) models—have the known flaw of underestimating tail risks.168  
                                                                                                                                                       
 164. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY 264 (2010) (explaining that 
“competition . . . force[s] banks to take risks . . . , provided the risks are legal and profit-maximizing, 
whatever their consequences for the economy as a whole”). 
 165. See, e.g., Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Harry Huizinga, Bank Activity and Funding Strategies: The 
Impact on Risk and Returns, 98 J. FIN. ECON. 626, 647 (2010) (showing “higher fee income and 
nondeposit funding shares increase bank risk”); WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS 5 (2009) 
(explaining that “Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns” 
were long on a constant verge of “a funding crisis” because of their excessive reliance on short-term 
credit). 
 166. Peter Conti-Brown, A Proposed Fat-Tail Risk Metric: Disclosures, Derivatives and the 
Measurement of Financial Risk, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461, 1462–63 (2010). 
 167. E.g., Viral V. Acharya et al., Manufacturing Tail Risk: A Perspective on the Financial Crisis 
of 2007–09, 4 FOUNDATIONS & TRENDS IN FIN. 249, 250–51 (2010). 
 168. E.g., Conti-Brown, supra note 166, at 1465 (identifying as a primary flaw of VaR that “in 
times of crisis, VaR fails to provide any clear content on risk exposures in the long tail, especially when 
those tails are fat”); Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 4, 2009 at 24, 26–27 
(quoting David Einhorn, founder of Greenlight Capital, a prominent hedge fund, who analogizes VaR to 
“an air bag that works all the time, except when you have a car accident” because of its failure to capture 
tail risks); Yasuhiro Yamai & Toshinao Yoshiba, Comparative Analyses of Expected Shortfall and Value-
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Incentive issues similar to those associated with systemic risk exacerbate the challenge.  Banks 
can earn significant profits from excessively discounting tail risks, and such risks often become 
manifest only in extreme adverse circumstances, that is, in the type of conditions when the 
financial system as a whole is most likely to be under stress and the government is most likely to 
intervene.169  Assuming that the tools and metrics a bank uses for assessing its own risk 
exposures are similar to those it uses when assessing the risk exposures of other banks, a typical 
bank’s lack of regard for the tail risks to which it is exposed directly portends a similar lack of 
regard for tail risks to which banks with whom it deals may be exposed.  Once again, these 
dynamics shape incentives in problematic ways, as banks are under-penalized for assuming tail 
risks. 
There is new pressure on banks to perform stress tests and otherwise evaluate how they 
would fare in extremely adverse circumstances.170  Nonetheless, tail risks are difficult to identify 
and measure, and banks continue to lack adequate incentives to identify and respond to them.  
Assuming that banks do not fully penalize other banks for assuming tail risks—either because 
the risk management tools they use do not capture them or because they have an incentive to 
discount them—the discipline banks impose on one another may accentuate their tendency to 
assume excessive tail risks. 
3. Correlation Seeking 
Similar issues arise with respect to correlated risk taking, which may pose challenges even 
apart from systemic risk.  Richard Squire has shown that because equity holders have limited 
liability, firms will rationally discount contingent liabilities to the extent that such risks are likely 
to become manifest in situations where the firm would already be bankrupt.171  As a result, firms 
                                                                                                                                                       
at-Risk (3): Their Validity Under Market Stress, 20 MONETARY AND ECON. STUD. 181, 182 (2002) 
(explaining that VaR models tend to “disregard the fat-tailed properties of actual returns, and 
underestimate the likelihood of extreme price movements”). 
 169. E.g., Acharya et al., supra note 167, at 291 (arguing that “the root cause of the crisis was the 
desire of highly leveraged [complex banks] to take even greater risks, generating even higher short-term 
‘profits,’” which they accomplished by “manufacturing” tail risks). 
 170. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 165(i)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1430 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365). 
 171. Richard Squire, Strategic Liability in the Corporate Group, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 605, 607–08 
(2011) (explaining shareholders’ interest in assuming intragroup credit guarantees as a means of 
increasing value for shareholders at the expense of creditors who will be unable to recover in the event the 
corporate group as a whole goes bankrupt); Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of 
Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1158–59 (2010) (detailing the advantages to shareholders posed by 
correlating company risks). 
60:5 Judge DRAFT  
(2/11/13 12:13 PM) Page 46 UCLA Law Review 
should seek to assume contingent liabilities that are positively correlated to significant risks to 
which they are already exposed.  Squire labels such behavior “correlation seeking.”  In order to 
engage in correlation seeking, a firm must be able to make sophisticated judgments about the 
risks to which it is exposed, the probability those risks will bankrupt the firm, and the correlation 
between those risks and other risks that the firm might assume.  In light of the centrality of risk 
management to banking and the significant resources banks invest in the endeavor, banks may be 
particularly adept at the practice.  Potentially counterbalancing correlation seeking by banks is 
the fact that banks and other financial firms are aware of this risk and are likely to be more adept 
than most counterparties at identifying such behavior and responding accordingly.172  Moreover, 
changes to the schemes used to compensate bank executives may make it so they are not solely 
responsive to equity holders, reducing their incentive to engage in correlation seeking.173 
Assuming that banks engage in correlation seeking, when Bank A is evaluating whether to 
assume credit risk with respect to Bank B, Bank A will reduce its assessment of the associated 
cost to the extent that Bank A believes it will already be bankrupt should the risk (of Bank B 
failing) become manifest.  To make the example more concrete, if Bank A has significant 
exposure to commercial real estate as a result of loans, guarantees, and other commitments, Bank 
A should be relatively more willing to write CDS on a bank similarly exposed.  This means that 
if Bank A is considering taking on a contingent liability with respect to Bank B or Bank C and 
the magnitude of their risk exposures are identical, Bank A should favor the bank whose risk 
exposures are more closely correlated to its own.  While the relevant reference point—the risk 
profile of the disciplining bank—is different from the relevant reference point for the systemic 
risk issue—the risk profile typical of banks—the effect of correlation seeking may be to 
exaggerate the tendencies described above.  Banks are rewarded, and thereby incentivized, to 
assume risks that are similar to the risks to which other banks are exposed; they are also 
discouraged from assuming idiosyncratic risks. 
These insights into banks’ incentives, coupled with the preceding sections, provide a picture 
of a system that is powerful, imperfect, and, from a social welfare perspective, flawed.  This 
implies that we can build a more stable financial system by reconsidering regulatory priorities 
and the allocation of finite regulatory resources in a way that addresses interbank discipline.  The 
                                                                                                                                                       
 172. INTERAGENCY GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at 10 (warning banks to be attuned to this type of 
risk). 
 173. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 956, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1905–06 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5641). 
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next Part provides the final piece of background necessary in order to determine the best way 
forward. 
IV. BANK SUPERVISION 
This Part introduces the key bank regulators.  It examines the aims of bank regulators, in 
part by looking at their history, the tools they have been given to accomplish those aims, and 
how they have used those tools.  The focus is on bank examination as the mode of regulation 
most likely to duplicate (and also potentially able to complement and counteract) interbank 
discipline.  An additional reason for this focus is that bank examination remains a critical 
component of financial regulation yet has received relatively little attention in financial reform 
discussions.  This introduction is brief, reflecting the Article’s primary aim of drawing attention 
to interbank discipline.  Yet even this sparse introduction provides an important point of 
reference for assessing the policy implications of interbank discipline. 
A. History and Incentives 
Currently, bank supervision is carried out at the federal level by three federal regulators, the 
Federal Reserve, the OCC, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), with primary 
oversight responsibility allocated according to the nature of the bank.174  As a result of mergers, 
conversions, and a bankruptcy, the leading investment banks are all now regulated as banks.175  
Additionally, the Federal Reserve’s oversight authority was expanded post-Crisis to encompass 
large financial institutions that are systemically significant even if they are not formally banks, 
so all U.S. complex banks, as that term is used here, are subject to oversight by one or more of 
these regulators.176 
The supervisory authority given to the banking regulators, and the aims of such oversight, 
stem largely from the Banking Act of 1933.  That Act created the FDIC, instituted deposit 
                                                                                                                                                       
 174. The Fed has primary oversight responsibility for all bank holding companies and state banks 
that are members of the Federal Reserve; the OCC has primary responsibility for all national banks and 
thrifts; the FDIC has primary responsibility for state banks and thrifts that are not members of the Federal 
Reserve.  See genrally MARK JICKLING & EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40249, WHO 
REGULATES WHOM? AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. FINANCIAL SUPERVISION (2009) (providing a summary of 
the primary federal institutions and mechanisms present in the U.S. financial regulation system). 
 175. See, e.g., Sewall Chan, Financial Debate Renews Scrutiny On Size of Banks, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 21, 2010, at A1 (describing how “Bank of America swallowed Merrill Lynch, JPMorgan Chase 
bought Bear Stearns” and “Goldman and Morgan converted to bank holding companies”). 
 176. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 113, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1398–1402 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323). 
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insurance, and expanded the oversight authority of both the Federal Reserve and the OCC.177  As 
a result, bank examination practices and procedures were formulated initially with the primary 
aim of protecting the insurance fund managed by the FDIC and, hence, tended to focus on 
maintaining the safety and soundness of individual financial institutions whose bankruptcy might 
result in claims against the fund.  Maintaining the stability of the overall financial system was 
also a clear aim of bank oversight, but until the Crisis, it was largely assumed that the stability of 
the system would follow from efforts to maintain the safety and soundness of the individual 
institutions that constitute the system.178 
The focus on ensuring the safety and soundness of individual banks holding insured deposits 
has been reiterated and affirmed over time.  Even the Federal Reserve, which has long had 
greater responsibility with respect to macroeconomic considerations than other bank regulators, 
has made this a top priority of its bank oversight activities, and it has done so even with its 
oversight of bank holding companies, institutions that control but are not themselves depositary 
institutions.179  Other institutional arrangements further perpetuate the focus on the safety and 
soundness of individual financial institutions.  For example, each bank regulator has an 
independent Inspector General that must undertake a detailed loss review every time a bank 
failure results in a material loss to the FDIC’s insurance fund or exhibits unusual circumstances 
that warrant an in-depth review.180  Knowing that their actions will be closely scrutinized in 
connection with such a failure augments the tendency of examiners to make the safety and 
soundness of individual banks their top priority.  To be sure, there have been significant changes 
                                                                                                                                                       
 177. See, e.g., Edward L. Symons, Jr., The United States Banking System, 19 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 
11 (1993); Mark B. Greenlee, Historical Review of “Umbrella Supervision” by the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 407, 453 (2008) (describing how the Fed’s 
authority over bank holding companies grew incrementally, starting in 1933). 
 178. MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., INT’L CTR. FOR MONETARY & BANKING STUDIES & CTR. 
FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH, GENEVA REPORTS ON THE WORLD ECONOMY: THE FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION xi (2009) (“The current approach to systemic regulation 
implicitly assumes that we can make the system as a whole safe by simply trying to make sure that 
individual banks are safe.”). 
 179. Greenlee, supra note 177, at 443 quoting Fed. Reserve Bd., Letter From Fed, Reserve Bd. to 
Fed. Bank Examiners, SR 00-13 (Aug. 15, 2000) (explaining that the purpose of consolidated supervision 
is to ensure that bank holding companies “are operated in a safe and sound manner so that their financial 
condition does not threaten the viability of affiliated depository institutions”) (emphasis added). 
 180. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(k) (2006).  OCC is a division of the Treasury Department and thus subject 
to review by its Inspector General. 
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in how bank regulators seek to promote the safety and soundness of individual financial 
institutions over this period of time, but the focal point has remained relatively constant.181 
A related way that the purpose of bank oversight has remained relatively constant over this 
time is in the expectation that bank examiners can best protect the safety and soundness of 
individual banks by using their oversight authority to engage in a thorough examination of each 
bank and, on the basis of that examination, reaching firm conclusions about the bank’s safety and 
soundness.  Even today, the Federal Reserve, for example, expects its examiners at the 
completion of each examination, “[t]o reach conclusions regarding the present condition of the 
bank[, t]o reach conclusions regarding the future prospects of the bank[, and t]o determine the 
bank’s ability to meet demands in the ordinary course of business or reasonably unusual 
circumstances.”182  This is comparable to the expectations placed upon examiners in 1933, when 
the nature of banking, buttressed by the Glass-Steagall Act, made banks much simpler, bank 
examination far easier, and “permitted the regulators to channel their efforts and expertise more 
efficiently.”183 
This brief history sheds light on the incentives of bank examiners.  While in theory one 
might presume that regulators should aim to maximize social welfare, in practice, incentives are 
often shaped by the history behind a regulator’s creation and the tasks with which it is charged.  
The history of bank oversight suggests that the key regulators, while concerned with maintaining 
the stability of the overall financial system, focus primarily on the survival of the individual 
institutions constituting that system.  This history also suggests that institutional arrangements 
within bank regulators are similarly structured to further this aim.  Further insight comes from 
looking at the authority given to bank examiners and their use of that authority. 
B. Institutional Competence 
Bank examiners enjoy a number of advantages over market participants, including banks.  
Many of these advantages relate to access.  In order to assess the safety and soundness of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
 181. Garten, supra note 46, at 504–05 (discussing the historical focus on narrow banking, the shift 
to a debtor-based approach and a subsequent shift to a deregulatory, equity-based approach to bank 
regulation). 
 182. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., DIV. OF BANKING SUPERVISION AND 
REGULATION, COMMERCIAL BANK EXAMINATION MANUAL 5020.2 (2010) [hereinafter FED, 
COMMERCIAL BANK MANUAL]. 
 183. Garten, supra note 46, at 520.  The Glass-Steagall Act, as originally conceived and 
implemented, created a hard line separating commercial banking from investment banking, resulting in 
less complex institutions. [Macey text]  
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institutions they oversee, each regulator is given broad oversight authority.  OCC examiners, for 
example, “have power to make a thorough examination of all the affairs of [any national] bank,” 
including the “power to administer oaths and to examine any of the officers and agents thereof 
under oath.”184  Further accentuating regulators’ unique access is their shift from periodic 
examinations to a regime of ongoing monitoring for the largest complex banks.185  This means 
that regulators have full-time teams of examiners working at each of the leading complex banks, 
closely following their operations and regularly interacting with their personnel. 
This type of access enables regulators to witness and analyze aspects of a bank’s risk profile 
and activities that are not transparent to, and may even be hidden from, market participants like 
banks.  Bank examiners, for example, are often in a better position than market participants to 
verify the accuracy of information that a bank discloses, including the accuracy of its disclosures 
regarding its policies, procedures, and even risk exposures.  Bank examiners may also be in a 
relatively better position to identify operational risks to which a bank may be exposed, such as 
those arising from weaknesses in a bank’s internal controls.  Empirical evidence supports the 
notion that this may be a way for examiners to add value, as studies have found that examiners 
may “exert additional discipline, beyond that provided by a bank's private auditors,” “examiners 
[have a] richer information set than the market does,” at least some of the time, and “examiners 
[a]re particularly good at discovering information that managers would prefer to conceal.”186 
Yet another advantage possessed by bank regulators arises from the tools they have to 
respond when they identify trouble.  Decisions that banks make with respect to their dealings 
with other banks are generally bundled decisions.  A disciplining bank may, for example, engage 
in a thorough analysis suggesting that another bank has strong management, a healthy balance 
sheet, including high-quality assets and low expected funding costs, and good growth prospects, 
but the disciplining bank’s analysis may further suggest that the bank is exposed to potentially 
significant downside risks from its overseas operations. In determining how to proceed in light of 
such an assessment, the disciplining bank must find a way to translate this multi-dimensional 
                                                                                                                                                       
 184. 12 U.S.C. § 481 (2006). 
 185. Review of Regulators’ Oversight of Risk Management Systems at a Limited Number of Large, 
Complex Financial Institutions: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., and Invs., Comm. on 
Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong., at Highlights (2009) (statement of Orice M. Williams, 
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Risk Management Systems]. 
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analysis into one-dimensional metrics, like credit exposure limits.  Such decisions have 
important economic implications and thus can have powerful disciplining effects, but they are 
necessarily quite coarse. 
Examiners, by contrast, are not so constrained.  Examiners have an array of tools, both 
formal and informal, that they can wield to bring about narrow but important changes in a bank’s 
operations.187  Bank regulators have the authority to issue cease-and-desist orders to compel 
banks to undertake particular conduct, to issue cease-and-desist orders against individual 
officers, directors and other insiders to further influence a bank’s operations, to impose civil 
penalties (which are often imposed on individuals within the bank), and even to remove bank 
management under certain circumstances.188  Regulators also have an array of less formal 
mechanisms for influencing bank behavior. For example, the need for regulatory approval for 
many activities, ranging from branch openings to acquisitions, combined with “the threat of 
severe sanctions, although rarely used, [has] made bank management more willing to acquiesce 
in the regulators’ informal requests for compliance.”189 
Despite their exceptional access and tool kit, finite resources, imperfections in the incentives 
and skill sets of those conducting bank examinations, and other factors limit the efficacy of the 
bank examination process.  In order to develop a more complete picture of the institutional 
competence of bank examiners, it is important to look past the authority granted to them to 
consider how they actually use that authority.  Agency costs within regulators complicate this 
analysis significantly, just as they do with banks, but some insights are possible.  Experience 
suggests that despite their massive toolkit, bank examiners regularly underutilize the tools 
available to them.  A recent study by the Government Accountability Office, for example, found 
that regulators identified an array of weaknesses, including “inadequate oversight of institutions’ 
risks by senior management,” “weaknesses in models used to measure and manage risk,” and 
“numerous stress testing weaknesses” at the leading complex banks in the years before the 
Crisis, but the regulators quite often failed to impose disciplinary measures commensurate with 
the weaknesses they identified.190  A further challenge is that forcing the closure of a bank—the 
most extreme but also the most important of a bank regulator’s tools—can be viewed as a sign of 
                                                                                                                                                       
 187. E.g., Symons, Jr., supra note 177, at 18–19; Garten, supra note 46, at 537–38. 
 188. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(b), (b)(1), (j) & (e)(1) (2006); Symons, supra note 177, at 19–20 
(explaining that the civil penalties are most commonly used against individuals “to the root of the 
problem”). 
 189. Garten, supra note 46, at 538. 
 190. Statement Regarding Oversight of Risk Management Systems, supra note 185. 
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regulatory failure and can give rise to short-term costs.  Thus, it is not surprising that there is a 
long history of bank regulators failing to close banks in a timely fashion.191 
Experience also sheds light on other institutional considerations, such as the processes 
through which bank examination procedures change in response to changes in banking.  The 
Federal Reserve, the OCC, and the FDIC all use the same basic methodology as a starting point 
for their examinations procedures.  Originally adopted in 1979, the Uniform Financial 
Institutions Rating System regime, more commonly known as CAMELS, provides a composite 
scored based upon a bank’s capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and 
sensitivity to market risk.192  All three agencies have made some significant changes to their 
examination procedures in light of the changing nature of banking, and have made further 
changes to address weaknesses revealed by the Crisis and third party reports.  The Federal 
Reserve, for example, recognizes that “[e]volving financial instruments and markets have 
enabled banking organizations to rapidly reposition their portfolio risk exposures,” and it has 
adopted a “risk-focused” approach to examinations in response.193  The FDIC and OCC have 
also updated their examination procedures and all three recognize the fundamental differences 
between community-based banks and today’s complex banks.194  Nonetheless, many of the core 
elements of the bank examination process have not changed.  The bank examination process 
remains largely focused on the safety and soundness of individual banks, CAMELS remains a 
centerpiece of the examination process for all three regulators, and a firm’s CAMELS rating 
remains a core component in determining how much a bank must pay for its deposit insurance.195  
The CAMELS components have also remained remarkably consistent since 1979, undergoing 
                                                                                                                                                       
 191. See, e.g., EDWARD J. KANE, THE S & L INSURANCE MESS: HOW DID IT HAPPEN? (1989); 
Catherine England, Lessons From the Savings and Loan Debacle: The Case for Further Financial 
Deregulation, 15 CATO REV. BUS. & GOV’T 36, 40 (1992). 
 192. E.g., FED, COMMERCIAL BANK MANUAL, supra note 182, at 1–2. 
 193. Id. at 1000.1, 4.1. 
 194. E.g., id. at 2 (describing examination procedures); Comptroller of the Currency, Bank 
Supervision Process: Comptroller’s Handbook 11−15 (2007) (describing the CAMEL regulatory ratings 
and examination systems); FDIC Office of the Inspector General, Office of Material Loss Reviews, 
Follow-up Audit of FDIC Supervision Program Enhancements, Report No. MLR-11-010 (2010) at 7–9 
(describing the Fed’s new “forward-looking supervision” approach); 
 195. E.g., FED, COMMERCIAL BANK MANUAL, supra note 182, at 1–2 (explaining that “to assess 
the bank’s performance and summarize its overall condition, examiners use the [CAMELS] rating 
system,” and that while there has been greater focus placed on risk management, the importance of 
assessing the CAMELS components has not diminished); Risk Categories & Risk-Based Assessment 
Rates, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/assessments/risk.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2012) 
(providing methodology for calculating how much a bank must pay for its FDIC insurance and revealing 
the centrality of a bank’s CAMELS rating to that determination). 
60:5 Judge DRAFT  
(2/11/13 12:13 PM) Page 53 UCLA Law Review 
only one significant revision in 1996, which resulted in the addition of just one component and 
other minor modifications.196  No dimension of this persistence can be attributed to success, as 
regulators regularly fail to identify troubled banks in a timely manner and other measures have 
proven to be better leading indicators that a bank will face financial distress than the bank’s 
CAMELS rating.197  Combined with the history provided in the preceding Section, this suggests 
that bank regulators, and bank examination procedures, tend toward incremental change, even 
when the banks they are regulating are undergoing more dramatic transformations. 
Another reason that bank regulators often fail to respond effectively to the dynamism of 
banks and banking is because they lack the tools, authority, or will for reasons relating to the 
political nature of the processes through which regulators are formed, granted authority, and held 
accountable.  These processes have been critiqued on a number of grounds, ranging from a 
strong tendency for inefficient systems to persist to being overly reactive when things go 
wrong.198  Put differently, in contrast to the strong economic incentives driving banks and other 
market participants, regulators are embedded in a system where the incentives might not just be 
weaker, but where they might pull in different and contrary directions. 
This overview of bank regulators is limited and painted in broad strokes, eliding variety that 
exists within and among the regulators and providing only a cursory introduction to some of the 
institutional dynamics that characterize bank regulators and their examination departments in 
particular.  Nonetheless, it illustrates clearly that bank examiners have different skill sets, tools, 
and incentives than banks.  These differences increase the potential for real value to be created 
by allocating finite resources in a way that capitalizes upon the relative strengths of bank 
examiners. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS 
The primary aim of this Article is to draw attention to the power of interbank discipline and 
shed light on its effects.  As both a byproduct of modern banking and a force that shapes the 
activities of modern banks, the significance of this phenomenon cannot be addressed in isolation.  
The Article’s descriptive account contributes to a number of ongoing debates regarding banks 
and financial regulation.  For example, responses to the Crisis resulted in banks that are larger 
and more interconnected, even as many commentators have argued that banks should be 
significantly smaller and less connected.  This Article’s insights contribute to that debate.  In 
showing how interbank discipline may reduce excessive risk taking, it suggests that there may be 
benefits to interbank connections that are underappreciated in most accounts.  At the same time, 
in drawing attention to the way that interbank discipline serves as an important mechanism 
through which banks may exploit the implicit government subsidy inherent in the possibility of a 
bailout, the Article simultaneously suggests that interbank connections may be troubling for a 
reason that is similarly underappreciated in most accounts.  There is reason to suspect that the 
more troubling aspects of interbank discipline exceed the corresponding benefits when banks 
have characteristics that make them likely bailout recipients. 
At the same time, the ramifications of interbank discipline on such debates cannot be 
resolved in the confines of this Article.  While the effects of interbank discipline are significant, 
they are also modest in relation to the other benefits and drawbacks of the evolution in banking.  
To try to answer such questions on the basis of interbank discipline would have the quality of the 
tail wagging the dog.  The Article, accordingly, does not try to address, much less resolve, the 
full panoply of potential policy issues raised by the dynamics here revealed.  Instead, it considers 
only a subset of policy implications, focusing on those that have received relatively little 
attention in post-Crisis reforms. 
In addition to being necessarily incomplete, the Article’s recommendations are necessarily 
preliminary.  Whether and to what extent each should be pursued are determinations that can be 
made only with significant further study.  There are a number of reasons for this.  As an initial 
matter, the degree of interbank discipline is a byproduct of interbank activity and that is not 
fixed.  A number of policies adopted in response to the Crisis have the intention or effect of 
reducing bank connectivity.  The proposed Federal Reserve and OCC regulations to reduce 
interbank exposures are but one example of the regulatory reform efforts already underway that 
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have the intention or effect of reducing bank connectedness.199  Efforts to push much of the 
derivatives market into centralized exchanges and away from the over-the-counter market are 
another reform effort that might result in a material reduction in interbank exposures.200  
Similarly, other policy responses to the Crisis, like the capital surcharges based upon bank size 
and connectedness embodied in Basel III, seek specifically to counteract banks’ tendency to 
develop the characteristics that might increase the probability of being bailed out.201  If such 
efforts succeed in perfectly offsetting the benefits associated with being a probable bailout 
recipient, the capacity of interbank discipline to serve as a mechanism through which banks can 
reap immediate financial benefits from changing their risk profile in socially problematic ways 
may become a moot issue.  More generally, banking is an inherently dynamic enterprise.202  Not 
only can we expect banks and banking to change in response to regulatory reforms, they will also 
adjust their degree of discipline in light of other market forces.  Depending upon the internal 
structures banks create to monitor and discipline other banks, for example, there is a real risk that 
the degree of interbank discipline will be cyclical, with discipline becoming less robust during 
credit bubbles.  Establishing and entrenching a regulatory regime that assumes the current levels 
of interbank discipline may thus be almost as problematic as ignoring this phenomenon 
altogether.  Despite these many challenges, this Article draws attention to a phenomenon that 
affects bank risk taking, that appears likely to persist, and which gives rise to a range of policy 
implications so long as it does.  The remainder of this Part addresses some of those implications. 
The Part proceeds in three Subparts.  The first Subpart draws attention to a fact that may 
seem clear from the analysis here but which has been overlooked at times by bank regulators.  
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The second Subpart creates a framework for responses that builds upon the complementarity 
approach advocated here.  It addresses ways that bank regulation, and examination procedures in 
particular, should change in order to more effectively promote financial stability in light of 
interbank discipline.  The third Subpart considers additional ways that regulators may promote 
effective interbank discipline and use the valuable information this market produces.  The 
recommendations that follow build upon one another, though most can be pursued independently 
of the others. 
A. Risk Management as a Double-Edged Sword 
One policy issue this Article raises relates to banks’ risk management systems.  Bank 
regulators have long encouraged banks to adopt more robust risk management systems, and 
regulatory efforts in this vein have ramped up significantly in the wake of the Crisis.203  These 
efforts are often premised on an assumption that improving risk management is an unmitigated 
good.  This Article reveals a more complex picture.  Banks bear primary responsibility for their 
own well-being and risk management systems are critical to that endeavor.  At the same time, 
banks may use risk management systems to alter their activities in ways that inure to their benefit 
while simultaneously contributing to the fragility of the overall financial system.  Efforts to 
exploit the implicit subsidy arising from the possibility of being bailed out is the most prominent, 
but not sole, example. 
One implication is that bank regulators should pay close attention to how risk management 
systems actually work and how they are used in practice, not assuming them to be entirely 
benign.  A second implication is that regulatory actions that promote the socially productive 
dimension of interbank discipline are likely to have the unintended consequence of facilitating its 
more problematic effects.  Requiring banks to disclose more information about their risk 
exposures, for example, might facilitate the capacity of banks and other market participants to 
discipline excessive risk taking, but could also be used to penalize idiosyncratic risk taking and 
reward the assumption of more systemically troubling forms of risk.  Given the limitations 
inherent in regulatory competence and resources, and the inevitability of interbank activity, this 
Article generally favors efforts to promote interbank discipline.  Nonetheless, this is but one 
example of the unintended consequences that might result, and hence the need for further 
analysis before pursuing any of the recommendations proposed. 
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B. Priorities and Resource Allocation 
This Subpart develops the Article’s primary policy claim that we should re-evaluate 
regulatory priorities and policies in light of interbank discipline.  It suggests three types of 
responses—duplication, gap filling, and counteraction—which collectively should enable 
interbank discipline and bank examination to work more effectively as complements and 
otherwise promote systemic stability.  It further suggests that it may be time to undertake a more 
fundamental re-evaluation of bank oversight priorities and procedures. 
1. Reducing Duplication 
One important implication of the vast resources banks devote to monitoring and disciplining 
risk taking at other banks is that it may not make sense for regulators to devote as many 
resources as they currently are to duplicating these activities. This does not mean that bank 
examiners should cease to engage in meaningful assessments of the nature and magnitude of the 
risks to which banks they examine are exposed.  Assessing a bank’s overall safety and soundness 
may enable examiners to be more effective at those tasks they are well positioned to undertake.  
For example, an examiner cannot effectively probe the efficacy of a bank’s risk management 
system without understanding the risks to which a bank is exposed and their potential gravity.  
Moreover, as reflected in the belt-and-suspenders approach to market discipline, the importance 
of determining how risky a bank’s activities are and the challenges inherent in making such 
assessments merit some duplication.  Nonetheless, the analysis here suggests that examiners 
devote more resources than are justified engaging in risk analyses that are already being carried 
out, with perhaps more skill and insight, by other banks. 
2. Gap Filling 
Devoting proportionately fewer resources to duplicating efforts undertaken by other banks 
should enable regulators to devote proportionately more resources to activities that banks are not 
motivated or positioned to undertake effectively.  The losses and reporting errors exposed by J.P. 
Morgan’s “London Whale” illustrate.204  The nearly $6 billion in losses the bank has incurred are 
the result of “trading mistakes,” and the gravity of the debacle was made worse as a result of 
personnel inside the bank apparently intentionally “plac[ing] inaccurate prices on their 
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positions,” in order to hide the losses.205  Verifying that trading practices conform to a bank’s 
own policies and procedures for valuing assets are the types of activities that regulators are better 
suited to perform than other banks.206  While there can be no guarantee that this particular 
situation would have been detected earlier, the situation exemplifies why there may be real value 
in allocating greater regulatory resources to such endeavors. 
The reasons to reconsider how we allocate finite bank resources thus arise less from 
concerns about potential waste than from a focus on relative value creation.  While some 
duplication is likely warranted, the degree will depend in part on the value of such duplication 
relative to the potential value that may be created by devoting greater regulatory resources to 
other activities.  The greater the range or importance of oversight activities that regulators are 
uniquely well positioned to address, the more difficult it is to justify significant duplication. 
3. Counteraction 
Yet another implication of the power of interbank discipline is that bank regulators, 
including bank examiners, should seek to address its adverse effects.  Core elements of our 
financial regulatory scheme, like the Federal Reserve’s discount window, are designed in part to 
respond to the tendency for the interbank market to contract more than is optimal during times of 
crisis.  In addition, Other efforts to reign in government bailouts and impose additional burdens 
on the banks most likely to receive them may reduce the magnitude of the implicit subsidy 
available.  Nonetheless, given that those responses seem destined to be incomplete suggests that 
bank examiners may have an important role to play in helping address the issues revealed here.  
In light of examiners’ ongoing monitoring and intimate knowledge of the activities of banks they 
oversee, bank examiners may be well positioned to identify changes in a bank’s activities that 
exploit this subsidy.  Moreover, the range of tools available to regulators to encourage or compel 
banks to change particular aspects of their operations may enable them to respond effectively to 
such developments.  This suggests that, while the nature of bank examination is always going to 
be micropruduential (that is, focused on individual institutions) in part, bank examiners may also 
have a role to play in macrodprudential regulation, that is, regulation aimed to promote the 
stability of the overall financial system. 
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4. Reconsider Goals 
Each of the three preceding considerations suggest that it may be time to engage in a more 
thorough evaluation of the appropriate priorities and procedures for bank examinations.  Such an 
inquiry may be particularly timely in light of the limitations inherent in traditional approaches to 
financial regulation revealed by the Crisis, including the need for bank regulation to become 
more macroprudential in its focus.207  This insight has received significant support from 
policymakers and academics, but it has thus far failed to trigger a broad-based debate about bank 
examination comparable to the debates that have arisen in regard to other aspects of financial 
regulation.208  This Article suggests that it might be time to start that conversation. 
The sketches of the institutional competence of banks relative to examiners provided here 
serve as a starting point, but further inquiry is warranted.  In addition to developing a more 
complete descriptive account of the skills, resources, norms, and other characteristics of bank 
examiners and the bank examination process, attention should also be paid to theoretical 
considerations.  For example, there may well be ways that bank oversight should assume a more 
macroprudential dimension beyond counteracting the problematic aspects of interbank discipline.  
These two lines of inquiry are necessarily related.  Placing theoretically ideal but pragmatically 
impossible goals upon bank examiners is a recipe for failure.  At the same time, the institutional 
competence of bank examiners should not be treated as fixed.  While current personnel, resource 
constraints, and other factors may impose meaningful constraints, change is possible.  One aim 
of the theoretical inquiry, accordingly, should be to inform the type of change that is desirable. 
As an ambitious initial step it may be time to reconsider whether assessing the safety and 
soundness of individual institutions should remain the top priority of bank examiners.  It may 
also be appropriate to reconsider the nature of the conclusions examiners are asked to reach.  In 
order to render judgments about the safety and soundness of an individual bank, one must first 
draw conclusions about the magnitude and nature of particular risks and then assess the 
sufficiency of efforts to manage them.  The strength of the U.S. real estate market in 2006 and 
the prospects for the Euro in 2012 are just two of the types of issues that have massive 
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ramifications for the safety and soundness of individual banks.  There is little reason to think that 
the judgment of a single regulator with respect to such an issue is likely to be more accurate than 
other banks’ collective wisdom about the same. 
At the same time, asking regulators to make such judgments, as the current regime 
inevitably requires, has a number of potentially adverse consequences.  First, given the 
inherently finite nature of regulatory resources, it reduces the resources available for other 
aspects of bank regulation.  Second, the current regime potentially impedes interbank and other 
forms of market discipline.  Even though bank examiners’ reports and conclusions are not made 
public, it is well known that regulators are expected to ensure the safety and soundness of 
institutions they oversee.  This may reduce market participants’ incentives to be as thorough as 
they otherwise would in evaluating other institutions.  It hence may be appropriate to modify the 
type of conclusions examiners are asked to reach by, for example, making them more narrow or 
reformulating them as conclusions that nothing came to the examiners’ attention that would 
justify intervention.  Such changes may have the additional benefit of protecting regulators’ 
reputation, to the extent such protection is warranted, and discouraging forbearance premised on 
the same, thus promoting accountability and credibility.209 
C. Working Together 
1. Promote Efficacy 
In light of the potential for banks to play a socially valuable role in monitoring and 
disciplining excessive risk taking by other banks, this Article suggests that regulators should 
promote the efficacy of such efforts.210  Making it clear that regulators are not vouching for the 
safety and soundness of the banks they examine and altering the nature of the conclusions bank 
examiners reach should further this aim, but there are other ways that regulators may further 
enhance the quality of interbank discipline.  For example, it has long been recognized that for 
market discipline to be effective, market participants must be able to make informed decisions 
about the risks to which a bank is exposed.211  Thus the primary role that regulators have played 
is in adopting and enforcing mandatory disclosure regimes.  Like other stakeholders, banks use 
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other banks’ public disclosures in their evaluations, so this remains important.  However, the 
value of such information is necessarily imperfect.  Banks can quickly change their risk profiles 
and, as reflected in Lehman’s famous “Repo 105” program, banks often will engage in activities 
specifically designed to disguise aspects of their operations.212  Banks may be particularly well 
situated to ferret out such efforts and otherwise obtain inside information about another bank’s 
activities, enabling them to make more informed decisions and impose higher quality discipline.  
For banks to do so, however, traders and other persons within the disciplining bank who have 
information about the risks to which other banks are exposed must convey this information to the 
disciplining bank’s credit risk management division.  This suggests that in addition to disclosure, 
bank regulators could improve market discipline by facilitating the formation and use of 
appropriate lines of communication within a bank, to the extent it is legal and appropriate.  While 
banks have private incentives for implementing systems, the rate at which such systems are 
created and used might be aided by on-site oversight. 
Regulators could also help ensure that banks remain diligent about monitoring and 
disciplining other banks even when times are good.  Among the factors contributing to systemic 
crises is the cyclical nature of credit conditions, facilitated by the tendency of market participants 
to alter their assessments of risk in light of recent conditions.213  While regulators can succumb 
to the same biases as market participants, their differential incentives could be used to try to 
promote a longer term perspective and find ways to counteract this tendency. 
2. Use Information 
A final benefit of interbank discipline is that it may produce valuable information about the 
riskiness of various banks.  One way that the current regulatory scheme might harness this 
valuable information is by using it as one of the factors affecting the premiums the FDIC charges 
for deposit insurance.  For example, the FDIC could add CDS spreads, which are influenced by 
interbank discipline, to the factors it considers when calculating the premium that should be paid 
by a complex bank.  The FDIC already uses a different formula for large, complex banks than for 
others and, until recently, it had used credit ratings as one component in calculating its 
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assessments.214  Because CDS spreads are distorted by expectations that a bank may be bailed 
out and other factors, the FDIC should exercise caution and consider making adjustments.  But, 
this is no reason for it not to use this valuable market-based information about a bank’s riskiness 
in making its assessment.215  Regulators might also consider other ways of incorporating banks’ 
assessments of other banks, or market measures reflecting those assessments, into their 
examination and other procedures.216 
CONCLUSION 
Bank connectivity and interbank discipline are not new phenomena.  The transformation in 
banking that has occurred over the last three decades, however, has transformed the nature and 
magnitude of the relationships among banks and their credit exposures to one another.  Interbank 
discipline is now a critical market force influencing banks’ risk taking and other activities.  This 
Article draws much needed attention to this development and the policy ramifications that 
follow, but it should mark but the first step in an ongoing examination of interbank discipline, its 
effects, and the future of bank examination. 
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